Jacob Smith ‘23
Professor Liason Editor
Welcome back to the biggest chess legal battle of all time: grandmaster Hans Niemann’s defamation suit against current chess world champion Magnus Carlsen, streamer and grandmaster Hikaru Nakamura, the website Chess.com, and others—a suit that was instigated by Magnus’s accusation that Hans cheated at the Sinquefield Cup. Last week’s article introduced the bare bones of the dispute and analyzed whether the defendants would be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. To recap, my opinion is that the Missouri court has jurisdiction over Magnus and possibly Chess.com, but probably not the other defendants. This week’s article digs deeper into the allegedly defamatory statements.[1]
Choice of Law
Missouri choice-of-law considers four factors: the place of the injury, the place of the conduct causing the injury, the location of the parties, and where the relationship between the parties is centered. The state with the most significant relationship is presumed to be the state where the injury occurred.[2] In a case involving “widespread dissemination” of the defamation, “the most important consideration in choosing the applicable law is the residence of the party allegedly defamed,”[3] under the theory that reputational harm hits you hardest where you live. Hans resides in Connecticut, so Connecticut law may apply. Missouri law is an alternative possibility, given that the St. Louis Sinquefield Cup and Magnus’s withdrawal from the tournament remain at the center of the lawsuit.
The defendants might argue for Connecticut law so they can invoke Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. In certain defamation cases, the anti-SLAPP statute allows for a “special motion to dismiss” where the court conducts an expedited hearing, can consider affidavits, and awards attorney’s fees if the case is dismissed.[4] But even if Connecticut law were to apply, there is a circuit split about whether anti-SLAPP statutes are procedural or substantive. If the court thinks they are procedural, they will not apply to cases, like this one, brought in federal court.
Defamation Elements
Hans’s complaint included other claims, but this article will just discuss defamation. The elements of defamation under Missouri law are “(1) publication (2) of a defamatory statement (3) that identifies the plaintiff, (4) that is false, (5) that is published with the requisite degree of fault, and (6) that damages the plaintiff’s reputation.”[5] Connecticut has a similar test.[6] Commentators seem to think the degree of fault is likely reckless disregard because Hans is a limited public figure for purposes of chess.
Most of the elements are not seriously contestable. Those in dispute should be first, whether the statements were false, and second, whether the defendants recklessly disregarded the possibility of falsity. The defendants can also raise defenses. In particular, they may argue that a defamatory statement was a statement of opinion, although such a statement is still actionable if it “could reasonably be interpreted as implying objective facts provable as false.”[7] The opinion defense will likely be a major focus at the motion-to-dismiss stage, since you can’t very easily prove truth or falsity on the pleadings.
Accusations of Cheating
Magnus’s allegations of cheating may well survive a motion to dismiss. Magnus withdrew from the Sinquefield Cup—a very unusual step—and posted a video of a soccer manager saying, “If I speak, I am in big trouble.” These steps, combined with the heightened tournament security measures that Magnus allegedly requested, clearly conveyed the claim that Hans had cheated. Magnus did not explain at the time why he thought Hans cheated, but he later asserted that Hans’s progress as a chess player “has been unusual” and that he “wasn’t tense or even fully concentrating on the game in critical positions” in beating Magnus.
A defamation claim based on Magnus’s allegations of cheating is likely to survive a motion to dismiss, as David French and Sarah Isgur have argued on the podcast Advisory Opinions. Magnus could be seen as stating an objective fact, and even as recklessly disregarding the possibility that he was wrong, given the scanty proof he has made public and Hans’s allegations that he had good reason to resent losing.
Accusations of Lying
Magnus, Chess.com, and Hikaru also all accused Hans of lying. After Hans admitted to a limited amount of online chess cheating, Chess.com stated on Twitter that it had shared evidence with Hans that “contradicts his statements regarding the amount and seriousness of his cheating on Chess.com.” Chess.com later doubled down on the accusation in their seventy-two-page report. Hikaru agreed with Chess.com that Hans was not being fully transparent about his prior cheating. Hikaru also called Hans’s analysis of his game against Magnus “complete nonsense,” in essence calling Hans a liar. Similarly, Magnus tweeted, “I believe that Niemann has cheated more – and more recently – than he has publicly admitted.” All those statements involve assertions of objective fact that could get past a motion to dismiss if a judge finds it plausible that the defendants could have acted with the “actual malice” required for speech involving a public figure.
Conclusion
It looks like Missouri or Connecticut law will apply. Further, there is a good chance that defamation claims against Magnus, Chess.com, and Hikaru survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, assuming personal jurisdiction over the defendants exists. I believe motions to dismiss are due next Monday, so, soon, you will be able to weigh the defendants’ legal arguments yourselves.
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js3hp@virginia.edu
[1] I am not a lawyer, so do not rely on the claims made in this article.
[2] Winter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 739 F.3d 405, 410 (8th Cir. 2014).
[3] Fuqua Homes, Inc. v. Beattie, 388 F.3d 618, 622 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 436–37 (Mo. 1984)).
[4] Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a.
[5] Turntine v. Peterson, 959 F.3d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000) (en banc)).
[6] Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 947–48 (Conn. 2015).
[7] Smith v. Humane Soc’y of U.S., 519 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Mo. 2017) (en banc).