Court of Petty Appeals: Commonwealth v. Allard

Commonwealth
v.
Allard
77 U.Va 11 (2024)

 

Coleman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Jones & Demitry, JJ., join.

Allen, J., concurs in the judgment.

Allard, C.J.?, joined by Coco, J., dissents.

Coco, J., dissents.

 

Coleman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court.

Our Editor-in-Chief is once again imperiled by criminal litigation. During his campaign for high office last year, he routinely falsified business records, with the aid of the then-Managing Editor and author of this opinion, in furtherance of campaign violations.[1] The conspirators would falsify Law Weekly printing receipts and distribute the ill-gotten proceeds among voting members of the paper. He was even delivering our extra Domino’s pizzas to administrative officials who helped him cook the books in the Law School Foundation accounts. For these crimes, he was convicted in a Virginia court. Somehow, he has kept this under wraps for several months. But his sentencing took place last week, and he is to spend the next twenty years behind bars.

The Law Weekly has no extradition treaty with the Commonwealth of Virginia. So, the question now arises: Will we respect this foreign criminal conviction of our EIC? Yes, we will. Chief Justice Allard will be turned over to Virginia authorities, stripped of all Law Weekly titles, and Justice Coleman will be elevated to Chief Justice and Editor-in-Chief.

I

This decision may seem at odds with our existing case law. See Law Weekly Editors v. Allard, 76 U. Va. 16 (2024) (“We now hold that the Editor-in-Chief, as sovereign of the Law Weekly, enjoys editorial immunity from suit.”). In particular, other Justices imagined a sweeping immunity. See id. (Coleman, J., concurring) (“This Court comes to the appropriate conclusion that their war crimes should never result in crushing civil liability.”); see also id. (Allard, C.J., concurring) (“[S]ome may interpret today’s decision as an effort by the Chief Justice to immunize himself from future litigation and entrench his position as the paper’s Editor-in-Chief. This is essentially correct. But who is going to stop me?”).

But those cases involved suits initiated after the EIC had taken office. The sweeping editorial immunity we envisioned only comes into existence when the office is assumed. Today, we are asked not to render a judgment de novo, but to respect a foreign judgment.

II

Independent of his ultimate criminal liability, Allard (sans C.J.) argues that enforcement should wait until his term of office ends. Without his unhindered leadership, the paper will surely fall into disarray. And in the lesser office of President of the United States, criminal lawsuits would have to wait until he leaves office.

But the Law Weekly has many editors who are willing and able to assume his duties upon this Court’s order. The regular functions of the Managing Board—assigning articles, reviewing for errors, securing Law School funding—can easily be fulfilled with our existing editor pool. So, there is no need to extend EIC immunity to criminal prosecutions secured before his tenure in office.

III

Yet another concern implicit in this case is the respect we will accord foreign judgments. Since no jurisdictions are our peers, we are not bound by any type of Full Faith and Credit Clause. Foreign judgments are valid insofar as we choose to make them valid.

But since this Court’s verdicts are rarely enforced in other jurisdictions, it is in our interest to show them some respect. Perhaps there is a day not so far in the future in which state and federal officials enforce our judgments against members of the public. That seems like a better result than our appointing a Law Weekly sheriff with dubious extra-territorial jurisdiction.

In conclusion, the Court ORDERS the following:
That former Chief Justice Allard be turned over to Commonwealth authorities.
That Justice Coleman assume his responsibilities immediately.

Allen, J., concurring in the judgment

While I hesitate to join the majority’s treatment of law and precedent (or throw my support behind Comrade Coleman), I ultimately agree that JUSTICE ALLARD does not enjoy immunity flowing from his position as EIC. I reach this decision on the basis of the structure of the Virginia Law Weekly Managing Board and write to inform the public about the political machinery and considerations at play. Contrary to many other political systems and organizations, and perhaps the assumptions of our readership, this paper is decidedly not democratic. Our managing board ‘electoral’ process consists largely of current leadership selecting and grooming their successors. This culminates in a ‘vote’ in which unanimous acclamation sees each elevated to their new post. The paper is modeled after the politburo, allowing us to avoid the inefficiencies and mistakes that democracy all too often allows. The upshot of this managed system is that the EIC, while wielding undoubted power during their tenure, is also a replaceable apparatchik, always fungible. As such, none of the justifications for allowing immunity through the term of office are persuasive, and JUSTICE ALLARD must face the full force of the Virginia legal system. I speak for all members of the Law Weekly in expressing the sincere hope that he hires a better lawyer for his appeal. 

Allard, C.J.?, joined by Coco, J., dissenting.

“Et tu, Brute?” See Ex parte Law Weekly, 76 U.Va 16 (2024) (Morse, C.J., dissenting). Why must I quote this now? We’re not even through the second act???

The Law Weekly is famous at UVA Law for many things, chief among them its steadfast commitment to democracy. See id. (majority opinion) (“Many successful ‘campaigns’ result from backroom dealmaking, and some Editors-in-Chief have opted to hand-pick their successors.”). As part of our democratic traditions, this Court annually observes its “sacred duty to harass the Editor-in-Chief on their way out.” Id. But I still have another semester and a half left in me. What gives?

“Justice” Coleman, in his overzealous scheme to dethrone me from my highly undesirable job, purports to respect Virginia law. I have never before observed in him any deference to state power, so I can only interpret his reasoning here as a naked attempt at usurpation.

Well, it won’t work. Justice Coleman’s order installing himself as Editor-in-Chief is patently unconstitutional. The Law Weekly Constitution requires a formal process for the removal of any member of the Editorial Board. See Law Weekly Const. Art. III § 1. That process requires the Editor-in-Chief to “notify in writing the Editor whose removal is sought.” Id. You can bet your sorry asses I won’t be notifying myself of anything without a writ of mandamus.

Further, even if Coleman succeeds in convincing the Executive Board to launch a premature coup against me, their efforts shall be in vain. The Editorial Board is a constitutionally separate body from the Executive Board. See Law Weekly Const. Art. I § 2 (establishing the Executive Board, “comprised of an Editor-in-Chief, Executive Editor, Managing Editor, Production Editor, and Features Editor,” or the “Constitutional Editors”); id. § 3 (establishing an Editorial Board “comprised of the members of the Executive Board, in addition to as many additional Editors as needed”).

The Editorial Board’s duties are limited to creating Editorial Board positions, selecting its members, and, when necessary, overriding decisions of the Editor-in-Chief. See Law Weekly Const. Art. I § 3. But it is the Executive Board and its chief officer, the EIC, that are charged with “the efficient operation of the entire publication.” Law Weekly Const. Art. II § 1. Our Constitution’s removal clause only provides for removal from the Editorial Board, not the Executive Board. See Law Weekly Const. Art. III § 1. (“Any member of the Editorial Board may be removed from his or her position for good cause upon a two-thirds vote of the Executive Board.”) (emphasis added).

While this Court has not affirmatively adopted this stance, I believe the Constitution’s text unambiguously entrenches all Constitutional Editors as irremovable tyrants. This is consistent with our historical practice of cheerfully toppling Editors-in-Chief only after their term has expired. See UVA Law Student Body v. Tonseth, 74 U.Va 10 (2021) (ordering the Editor-in-Chief to “hard labor and cultural reeducation training, to be carried out in the Darden basement”); see also Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake, 75 U.Va 16 (2023) (dragging the outgoing Editor-in-Chief for confusing two admittedly similar editors).

Nothing in the majority’s erroneous and unconstitutional opinion can bind me, for I shall lie outside of their grasp during my imprisonment by the Commonwealth. Their premature putsch is amusing, but they shall have to wait until February to finalize my undoing. In the meantime, I shall govern from prison. If other heads of state follow suit, I shall only assume that it is because my cause is so noble as to become fashionable. Is this foreshadowing something? Probably not, but it would be really funny if it did.

Coco, J., dissenting.

I certainly agree with the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the Law Weekly’s Constitution “unambiguously entrenches all Constitutional Editors as irremovable tyrants,” although mindful of this institution’s evergreen commitment to democracy, I reject the Chief Justice’s rhetorical bluster. I write first, then, to disavow Justice Allen’s blunt assault against the democratic traditions and legitimacy of this institution. Any objective observer present on election day would witness no impropriety as the managing board is nominated and confirmed by vote with collegial unanimity. A peaceful transfer of power transpires, save the dutiful rhetorical harassment of the outgoing Editor-in-Chief. If it looks like democracy and smells like democracy, it certainly seems like it is in fact democracy.

But second, I also write to challenge the majority’s spurious conclusion that this jurisdiction’s immunity doctrine is limited to an Editor-in-Chief’s official term. On the contrary, expanding immunity seems vogue these days, and I see no reason why this Court should buck the trend. Specifically, I believe this Court’s immunity doctrine should expand to protect even inferior Managing Board officers acting in contemplation of further participation in the Law Weekly. Thus, Justice Allard’s then-status as Executive Manager of the Law Weekly at the time of the conduct in question protects him from this insurgent claim. This outcome should satisfy Justice Coleman, lest the power of the state he so sycophantically upholds should aim its sights on his own transgressions. This conclusion is also borne of the practical necessities of institutional survival, for who among us has not succumbed to the seductive allure of pettiness and chicanery?


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[1] Noble Bar Examiners: You have likely discovered many distressing allegations against our EIC in this Court. Please take note of our petty jurisdiction.

Halloqueen!

Photo Sources: Rachel St Louis '26, Cayleigh Soderholm '26, Kelly Wu '27, Hannah Lu '26, & Kyle Trotman '26 

Thank you! 

Court of Petty Appeals: Office of Private Practice v. Public Interest Law Association

Office of Private Practice
v.
Public Interest Law Association
77 U.Va 10 (2024)

 

Coleman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Jones, Demitry, & Coco, JJ., join.

Allard, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Allen, J., dissenting.

Coleman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court.

With all the attention on the Public Interest Law Association (“PILA”) over the past week, the Office of Private Practice (“OPP”) felt like something had to be done. So, OPP and every major U.S. law firm filed this class action lawsuit against PILA, seeking compensatory damages for decades of brain drain away from BigLaw and a permanent injunction that would dissolve PILA once and for all. Plaintiffs claim that PILA is guilty of civil RICO violations, antitrust violations, and common law fraud. All parties submitted motions for summary judgment, and the lower court granted the defendant’s motion in full. We reverse in part and issue a unique injunction. PILA is not guilty of any of these alleged legal wrongs. But this Court will stretch its equity powers to their fullest extent. From now on, PILA must include a disclaimer that firms allow pro bono work.  

I 

We begin by noting that the plaintiffs do have legitimate beef with PILA. As one anonymous BigLaw partner put it: “I can no longer trust the prestige of the top law schools. How am I supposed to run a practice group when my best associates leave after three years to go work in some public defender’s office? And how am I supposed to justify these bills when the junior lawyers in the DOJ’s office are better than my own associates?” Another partner voiced similar concerns: “Top students routinely come into summer associateships with fanciful ideas like there is somehow more to law than private practice. PILA is to blame.” The issue that firms are facing is that too many brilliant students are presented with alternative career paths.

PILA responds by saying public interest work is an admirable pursuit and a cornerstone of legal practice. While boring, they have a point.

II 

Both the RICO and antitrust claims are based on anti-competitive conduct committed by PILA. Plaintiffs allege that PILA is given significant access to law students and abuses notions of “justice,” “public service,” and “morality.” The Court considers these to be sharp business practices and therefore finds them anticompetitive.

But plaintiffs fail to address the proximate cause issue. While law students mainly act to earn the recognition and praise of others, they retain some independent thinking. And a law student’s choice to pursue public interest is what ultimately causes harm to the plaintiffs, not necessarily the solicitations of PILA. So, both RICO and antitrust claims are dismissed for failure to show proximate cause.

III

When evaluating the fraud claim, we apply our own common law. A plaintiff asserts a claim for fraud when there is a misrepresentation of fact, that the statement-maker intended the plaintiff to rely on, that caused injury, and that would be funny to compensate. The statement at issue is that students can have fruitful lives outside of private practice. While an obvious misrepresentation, the plaintiffs are not the proper class to bring suit. They therefore lack standing, despite their efforts to assert third-party standing.

The true victims of PILA are the lawyers who could have had rewarding careers in private practice but chose instead to work in the public sector. Imagine the horror of being a U.S. Attorney, non-profit general counsel, special counsel, or public defender. It is the Robert Muellers ’73 of the world who fall victim to PILA.

No matter what plaintiffs say, they have not established a case for third-party standing. Those lawyers themselves are in a perfect position to assert their own rights. Any harm done to the firms is purely incidental to that suffered by these lawyers. So, the fraud claims must fail.

IV  

While the plaintiffs have lost on every issue addressed so far, this Court loves to offer buzzer-beater opinions that change everything in the final section à la Marbury. So, this Court recognizes that it is sitting in equity. And no justices have a clear understanding of what equity means, so we take it as a license to do whatever we want when the law fails, just as St. Thomas Moore would have wanted. We therefore raise the pro bono issue sua sponte.

Firms do allow their lawyers to participate in pro bono work, and compensate them for their time spent helping those clients. We think that this nuance is lacking in PILA’s approach to law students. We therefore order that this disclaimer be included in all PILA communications:

Public interest work can be found in private practice through pro bono projects. Wealthy attorneys are not all evil.

The Court thinks that this should be enough to remedy the legitimate beef of plaintiffs. And since we don’t understand equity, we don’t think proximate cause and standing should limit our ability to dole out bizarre injunctions. It is so ORDERED.

 

Allard, C.J., concurring as to parts I-III and dissenting as to part IV.

Though I am loath to admit it, I agree with Justice Coleman that the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment must fail. The remedy sought by Plaintiffs—siphoning off UVA Law’s last remaining public interest students to work eighty hours a week for America’s bluest-blooded aristocrats—easily passes the canon of uncomical avoidance. But in light of my recent dissent in LexisNexis v. Doe, I cannot let humorous considerations override the clear law at issue in this case. See 22-77-9CV (Allard, C.J., dissenting) (“Yes, we must commit to the bit, but in doing so, we must follow proper procedure and at least kinda adhere to our law.”).

But I believe Justice Coleman errs in crafting a compromise equitable remedy. While the principle I set out in Doe precludes granting Plaintiffs’ motion at law, nothing prohibits such a ruling in equity, where Pettry Rule 1 is at its strongest. See PRCP 1 (“We do what we want.”). Moreover, it would be particularly funny to hold that the law prevents a summary judgment motion for Plaintiffs, only to grant the same motion styled as an “equitable remedy.” Nothing prevents us from doing this. See Law Weekly Editors v. Allard, 76 U.Va 21 (2024) (“[W]ho is going to stop me? You?”). Moreover, the Court’s equitable remedy, ostensibly in Plaintiffs’ favor, is an insult to their convictions. In bringing this suit, they have embraced their inner evil. It is not for us to deny them their freedom of conscience.

In short, I would uphold the District Court’s summary judgment order under some inventive equitable doctrine. I thus respectfully dissent.

Allen, J., dissenting

As the only 3L Justice of this Court who spent the prior summer outside of the ivory (or, more commonly in the age of modern architecture, glass) tower of the firm, I feel the need to correct some illusions peddled by this court. First, the assertion that “[w]ealthy attorneys are not all evil” is contestable at best, as most individuals are middling if not outright contemptible—an original sin that is only exacerbated by both legal education and money. More importantly, this Court once again goes to bat for the privileged class to which they belong, at the expense of discrete and insular minorities. A sense of superiority and moral opprobrium by public interest students towards their private practice peers is the only material advantage that these poor souls can claim. To diminish this under the guise of “equity” sullies whatever legitimacy remains for this Court. Thus, I dissent.


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jxu6ad@virginia.edu

Hot Bench: Joe Fore '11

Hi Professor Fore! Thanks for taking the time to meet with me today. I know you are preparing to read all of our memos, so I will do my best to be quick. I guess we can get started with a little introduction. Where are you from, how long have you been at UVA, and what classes do you teach?

I grew up in Orlando, Florida. I’ve been here since 2015, and I teach Legal Research and Writing and a seminar on ethical values—a course on stoicism.

 

What inspired you to transition from practicing to teaching, and what drew you to LRW specifically?

I really enjoyed the craft of writing, it was my favorite part of being a lawyer and practicing. Structuring arguments, making arguments, using cases and other authorities to build an argument. I wanted to teach that to students, help them develop their own style, their own methods of writing, and that's why I specifically like teaching Legal Research and Writing. Also, I think it's great to be able to work with first-year students in particular. To help them think about the kind of lawyer they want to be, not just in terms of the mechanics and the tasks, but also in terms of professional and ethical identities and how they want to interact with clients and colleagues. So I view my job a little more broadly than just the mechanics of writing. We're doing more of the real work of lawyering, so we get to infuse our lessons with more professional identity questions.

 

Speaking of building professional identity, what is one piece of advice you would give to law students? 

I think it would be that you have to handle every task that you do with care and with precision, even what seem to be the smallest or the most mundane tasks, because you never know what thing will make a difference in a case, dealing with a client, or in your own career. Making sure that everything is done with care will ensure that you give yourself the best chance possible to succeed. Not treating anything as something that can be overlooked or is small, every task needs to be something that you give your attention and your care.

 

On that note, what is one legal writing mistake, or just a writing mistake in general, that bothers you the most?

In legal writing, specifically, when people don't preview the outcome of their analysis or their decisions. Judicial opinions, for example, that don't start out by telling you who wins. They say, you know, this case presents an interesting question, but they don't actually tell you which way they're resolving it. When legal writers don't tell you right up front what their key point is, or their key conclusion is, they keep you guessing. That's not a fun spot to be in as a reader.

 

I know we touched on this in class a little bit and , you've spoken about it, but for everybody else, what effect do you think that AI will have on legal research and writing and lawyering in general, if any?

I don't think it's quite as revolutionary of a change as people think. I think it largely is just a more efficient way of doing some of the things that we've already been doing. When I was in law school, we had to do a lot more of the terms and connector searching. You had to build those searches more carefully, because you had to tell the programs how to do their searches. And now the AI is basically doing that job for you. So you're just interfacing with the computer in a different way, but you're still achieving the same thing. The algorithm is just collating that information. It's just making it a more efficient way of gathering up and formatting that information. So I think that's probably the biggest use of AI, in terms of writing and research. I will say there probably are, and I'm not as well versed in this, a lot more uses in things like discovery, or document review, where AI can help in identifying or locating documents more efficiently. I just don't interact with those as much because those are more in the private space, like proprietary systems. But in terms of just legal research and writing tasks, it's just doing the job a little quicker, and I think for your generation of law students and new lawyers, it'll just become part of how you interact with the computer.

 

Okay, we’re going to pivot to lightning round. What's your favorite part about living in Charlottesville?

Nature, proximity to nature.

 

Lexis or Westlaw?

Westlaw, usually.

 

What's your favorite holiday?

Thanksgiving. I do most of the cooking for Thanksgiving, and I really enjoy that.

 

Do you have any pets?

Yes, I have one cat. He's a middle-aged male cat.

 

What was the first job you ever had?

I was a grocery bagger at Publix in Florida.

 

And are you reading or watching anything right now?

I've been reading a series of Sci-Fi novels called the Hyperion series, by a guy named Dan Simmons. I think I got through the first three books, and there's one more. I don't usually read Sci-Fi, but I've been reading that.

 

What was your favorite class you took when you were at UVA (other than LRW, obviously)?

Probably Constitutional Law with Fred Schauer, who just passed away. Having Con Law with Fred Schauer was amazing. He was just a mountain of a person, an incredible mind, very generous, thoughtful, and so deeply knowledgeable. Also, Criminal Investigations with Professor Coughlin. I never practiced criminal law, but just understanding the concepts I thought was super valuable. Those were both great classes that I look back on very fondly. Although you can make a note, I had so many, it's very hard to choose. So many of my former professors and now colleagues were just great.


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Interviewed by Alicia Kaufmann '26 

 

 

Court of Petty Appeals: LexisNexis v. Doe

LexisNexis
v.
Doe
24-77-9CV

The application for a stay presented to Justice Coco and by him referred to the Court in case No. 24-77-9CV is granted. The District Court of Petty Complaints’ order is stayed pending further order of the Court.

Allard, C.J., dissenting.

The Court today grants LexisNexis’s stay, upending our precedent and implicating us in the cluttering of law students’ already-cluttered email inboxes—all without briefing or argument. The Court’s decision is especially perplexing, given the high bar for a stay pending appeal. Concerned by the Court’s cavalier disregard for our law, I dissent.

Respondent, an anonymous student who described himself only as “a ruggedly handsome six-footer,” filed suit against LexisNexis, alleging tortious interference with inbox management. Respondent explained that he has “tried one hundred times to unsubscribe . . . from LexisNexis emails,” but has nonetheless received no less than ten emails in September, and had received another seven by the time this case was filed in mid-October. Respondent sought injunctive relief and punitive damages for “ignoring . . . unsubscribe requests” and “that Clifford the Big Red Dog color scheme.”

Ruling only on the email subscription issue, the district court temporarily enjoined LexisNexis from emailing the Respondent. In its order, the district court relied on our holding in In re Coronavirus Emails, where we enjoined the Law School from sending too many pandemic-related emails. 72 U. Va 20 (2020) (“[A]ll persons are ordered to ask, ‘Does this need to be sent?’ before any emails are sent.”). Argued at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, we reasoned that the horde of Covid-related emails unfairly required students to “decide if the cost of not reading the email and missing something outweighs the benefits, and wander forth into the great virtual unknown.” Id.

Facing what would become a severe global pandemic, this Court said “tl;dr.” That is a testament to the pettiness of the Justices who unanimously authored In re Coronavirus Emails. And it has clear implications for this case. As the district court explained at length, if a global pandemic was not serious enough for us to open students’ inboxes to a flood of emails, then surely LexisNexis’s latest law school guide is not. LexisNexis may spread like a virus, but it is not half as important as one.

The ordering justices, perhaps too busy counting their Lexis rewards points to read our precedent, instead choose to ignore it. Capitulating to LexisNexis’s insistence that the precedent was wrongly decided, the Court effectively reverses Coronavirus Emails with hardly any briefing on its merits. It may well be that In re Coronavirus Emails ought to be revisited. LexisNexis argued that the Court’s bit commitment principles, see Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake, 75 U.Va 16 (2023) (Lake, C.J., concurring) (“There is nothing more vital to the exercise of justice than committing to the bit.”), require us to permit the avalanche of LexisNexis emails, as it contributes to the suffering of 1Ls, which everyone knows is funny.

That may be so. But any reversal of our precedent must come after briefing and argument. To do otherwise is an abdication of our duty as petty jurists. Yes, we must commit to the bit, but in doing so, we must follow proper procedure and at least kinda adhere to our law. Otherwise, we risk shattering the illusion that the countless minutes of research and writing that lawyers put into our cases actually move the needle.

Like any self-respecting law student, I use Westlaw, and I know that LexisNexis’s primary purpose is financing 1Ls’ Chipotle needs. See SOHUNGRY v. LexisNexis Rewards, 75 U.Va 23 (2023). Given my animus toward LexisNexis, I am unlikely to rule in their favor if we grant a full argument in this case, which further weighs against their likelihood of success on the merits. Truly, this order should have been one of those beautiful moments where my priors align perfectly with our precedent, and I hardly have to do any mental gymnastics to enforce my will upon the Law School. Instead, I have been forced by my fellow justices to pen this angry dissent. And I do so disrespectfully.

 

Allen, J., concurring.

Too long; didn’t read. 


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tya2us@virginia.edu

Hot Bench: Ashley Anumba '25

Hi Ashley! Thanks for sitting down with me for this week’s Hot Bench. To start off, want to cover the basics: name, class year, where you’re from, and what were you up to this summer?

I’m Ashley Anumba, class of 2025, and I am from Los Angeles, California. This summer I competed in the Olympics as a discus thrower for Nigeria.

I think your “what I did this summer” takes the record for the coolest answer ever. How was your experience at the Olympics? Any standout moments at the actual Games or in Paris in general?

It was the highlight of my life; to achieve something that you have been working on for ten years, intentionally or unintentionally, feels empowering. Having my family, friends, high school coach, and many others present to support me will always be one of my most cherished memories.

That’s so great to hear. I was for sure glued to my couch when you were competing! Was this your first time in Paris? Can you give us a rating?

This was my first time in Paris, I loved it! A solid eight out of ten.

I was following the different Olympians’ adventures throughout the summer, and you all seem like you get along super well. But there’s nothing like straight from the source, so how close are you to your fellow discus throwers?

Many of us top discus throwers are good friends! It’s basically sisters coming back together when we are at competitions. I have always enjoyed the bond we share. Despite us living all over the world and representing different countries, many of us want the best for each other.

I love that for you guys. That’s such a unique and fun sisterhood to have. What got you into discus throwing?

I tore my ACL in high school playing soccer and eventually switched to track and field.

Oof, that’s a very tough injury to experience, so glad you got to turn it into a new path for yourself. How was the transition from full-time Olympic athlete to full-time law student?

It was difficult, especially since there was no downtime between the end of the Games and the start of school. I am happy to be back though—I really enjoyed school!

Aww, I know we’re all super happy to have you back! What do you see for yourself in the future for law or for discus?

I will hang up my throwing shoes very soon. This chapter of my life has been fulfilled and I am ready to explore different sides of who I am. Who knows? I may take up a new sport.

Oo, we’ll have to come back for the inside scoop on that. Time for a little lighting round: Halloween edition!

What’s a Halloween costume you don’t want to see this year?

Nothing basic like a black cat. But who I am to judge? I have no costume for this year.

What’s your least favorite Halloween candy?

Anything that’s not chocolate.

What’s your third favorite Halloween movie?

I can’t even name the first one, sorry!

Yay or nay: On November 1, is it appropriate to start playing Christmas music?

Definitely approve, I even started watching Christmas movies weeks ago.


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Interviewed by Ashanti Jones '26 

Court of Petty Appeals: In re the Ghastly Specter of Christopher Columbus

In re the Ghastly Specter of Christopher Columbus

77 U.Va 8 (2024)


Allard, C.J., delivers the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court.

Background

This nuisance action was brought by a  group of law students who allege that the ghost of Christopher Columbus haunts their fall breaks, preventing them from relaxing during the brief mid-semester[1] respite from classes, thus causing them significant physical, emotional, and psychological harm. Citing the ubiquitous annual think-pieces[2] on the historical relevance of Christopher Columbus and the gauche juxtaposition of “Columbus Day” and “Indigenous People’s Day” on calendars, students say they have had enough. They ask the court to enjoin the Ghastly Specter of Columbus from continuing to haunt these Grounds.

Because the Ghastly Specter of Columbus is a non-corporeal entity, Plaintiffs seek to hale him into court under our in rem jurisdiction. Appearing specially, the Specter of Columbus replied,The Court contacted several paranormal investigators to decipher the Specter’s speech, but no qualified candidate responded. Faced with this predicament, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to submit legal arguments on our ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Specter. Having read Plaintiffs’ brief, we now order the case continued for thirty days to give Plaintiffs the opportunity to identify a qualified interpreter. If no such interpreter is found, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice.

 

Discussion

The Court of Petty Appeals exercises jurisdiction over  “all petty disputes related to the Law School.” Students for Attending Cool Events v. UVA Law Faculty, 76 U.Va 13 (2024). Historically, we have broadly interpreted our jurisdiction, spanning from pandemic health protocols, 2L v. COVID Protocols, 74 U.Va 16 (2022), to fashion trends, In re Pleats, 303 U.Va 295 (2019), and even on several occasions to God, 1Ls v. God, 73 U.Va 16 (2021); Students of UVA Law v. God, 76 U.Va 9 (2023).

Any discernible limitation on this Court’s jurisdiction is surely defeated by the (in)famous first rule of petty procedure. See PRCP 1 (“We do what we want.”). So broad is this court’s jurisdiction, that a very wise justice once remarked that “jurisdictional argument serves only to assist this Court in reaching its word count requirements.” Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake, 75 U.Va 16 (2023). This is especially true in the instant case, which is entirely about jurisdiction, rather short, and published immediately after fall break.

Nevertheless, “[t]here is nothing more vital to the exercise of justice than committing to the bit.” Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff, 75 U.Va 16. Thus, we believe it proper in this case to write a rare and pointless opinion about personal jurisdiction, hopefully forcing our readers to suffer through memories of Pennoyer.

We most recently considered the reach of this court’s personal jurisdiction in Students for Early Spring v. Punxsutawney Phil, 75 U.Va 19 (2023). In Punxsutawney, we held that the Court could permissibly exercise personal jurisdiction over Punxsutawney Phil—who allegedly spoke only Groundhogese—provided that the court’s proceedings were “comprehensible”  to him. Id. Further, in Law Weekly v. The Swarm of Murderous Bees, we effectively exercised personal jurisdiction over a swarm of bees only capable of communicating via buzzing noises. 77 U.Va 2 (2024). Plaintiffs rely on Punxsutawney and Swarm of Murderous Bees in arguing that the Defendant’s apparent inability to communicate with mortals should be no bar to our exercise of personal jurisdiction. We disagree.

In Swarm of Murderous Bees, the bees did not appear specially. Instead, they flew directly into Plaintiffs’ faces and their solo cups. There was nothing “special” about this. Accordingly, they had already waived objections to our exercise of personal jurisdiction. Further, the issue of personal jurisdiction was never raised by either party. Our failure to dismiss the case on personal jurisdiction grounds is thus non-precedential.

Further, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Punxsutawney ignores several key differences with the present case. First, unlike in this case, in Punxsutawney the court had access to a Groundhogese interpreter. Second, our decision to exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Phil in Punxsutawney was motivated by our skepticism that Mr. Phil truly could not understand English. Conflicting evidence in the record suggested that Mr. Phil’s alleged monolingualism was a convenient excuse for dismissing the case. Here, Plaintiffs have identified no comparable evidence of opportunism.

We believe that haling the Specter of Columbus into court without an interpreter to explain the proceedings to him would violate his due process rights. Plaintiffs object that requiring them to identify a paranormal expert able to converse with Fourteenth Century Genoan-Spanish spirits is unduly burdensome. We understand that identifying a qualified expert will be challenging and may perhaps prevent this litigation altogether. But the interests of justice demand that a defendant comprehend what they are accused of. The case is continued for thirty days, after which it shall be dismissed if no qualified interpreter is identified.


---
tya2us@virginia.edu

[1] Yikes.

[2] This is a very generous use of the word “think.”

Weekly Slaughter Tribute Poems

Slaughtered 

Elizabeth Patten ’25 

A most egregious crime 

In the dead of summertime 

Left our hearts forever altered – 

A Staircase led to Slaughter. 

The Tragedy 

Micah Stewart ’25 

Pacing down the hall 

Aghast to find no Stairs, and 

In her place – a wall.


Hot Bench: Sam Quinan '25

Hello, Mr. Quinan, welcome to the Hot Bench. Could you please introduce yourself to our vast audience?

I am from Richmond, VA and went to Colgate University for undergrad. After college, I worked on campaigns in 2016, 2017, and 2018 (some were more fun than others) before going to the Senate from 2019—2022, spending most of my time working for Senator Dick Durbin. After graduation, I am excited to be going back up to D.C. to work in private practice.

From Capitol Hill to law school—a trailblazer I see. Do you have any good stories from your time on the Hill?

Oh yeah, the Trump years were, if nothing else, never dull. I was there for two impeachment trials, worked on two SCOTUS confirmations (again, one was more fun than the other), and was there for the fiasco that was 2020—with the pandemic, the protests, the election, and January 6 to top it all off. Thankfully, I stayed home that day—but it made for an eventful, if not exciting, end to a bizarre time in Washington. I’ll have to be a good comms staffer and keep anything more specific off the record for now.

Convenient that you didn’t clock in on January 6 . . . Do you have any ambition to return to politics? White House Counsel, perhaps? Or is civil litigation your life’s calling?

I will certainly not be going back into politics, at least not anytime soon. And as odd as it may sound, yes I do think litigation is as close to a “life’s calling” as I could have. As you probably know too well, I love arguing. And, for as long as I can remember, I wanted to be a litigator (like my father). So, unless I somehow develop a ninety-five plus mph fastball in the next six months, I think I’ll be in litigation for the long haul.

From what I experience on first base, it sometimes feels like you might hit ninety-five mph. Or maybe I just need a trip to the optometrist. With that segue, what has been your favorite class in law school?

There have been so, so many . . . but I think that my answer would be anything taught by Professor Collins. I loved my civil procedure class, and against all odds I loved Conflicts of Law. I love his teaching style and ability to keep the class engaged and laughing, even as we delve into complex and difficult issues.

Turning to an obvious passion of yours: beer-league softball. How have you been able to maintain a section team with a healthy roster through the years?

I think it all comes down to luck. We got lucky to have a section that has gelled so well together and that legitimately likes spending time with one another. So, since we’re all actually friends outside of school, it’s not too much of an ask to spend an hour with your friends drinking a beer and playing some softball. Aside from that, it is probably due to my magnetic personality and my preternatural leadership skills.

Another obvious passion of yours is history. Do you have any hot historical takes for the audience?

Ha, I am not sure that I do, at least not any that anyone here will understand. Unfortunately, law school has inhibited my ability and desire to read for pleasure, so I haven’t been able to do as much reading outside of school as I would like or used to. That being said, I am thankful that there are so many history-focused podcasts out there that are able to scratch that itch for me. In particular, and maybe this is a hot take (or a shameless plug) I am a huge fan of The Rest is History podcast, and am even a member of their fan club, if you can believe that.

A few of your younger friends at the law school often look to you for sage advice. Would you like to share any wisdom with the younger readers of this paper?

I would just recommend that everyone enjoy your time at law school and in Charlottesville. Big law hourly requirements aside, work is work: it’s not always fun, even the best jobs, and you will have to do it for the rest of your life. That’s the reason I am most glad to have taken some time off between undergrad and law school. It gave me some perspective and has allowed me to enjoy being here that much more. I really do think of it as a three year break from the slog of working and living in a city.

Finally, for a piece of hard hitting journalism, are you trying to hide your golf swing from me?

I am definitely worried about what it’s going to look like after more than a year of not picking up a club. But I’ll be out there soon enough—maybe I’ll surprise you. But from what I’ve heard, you are quite meticulous as a coach, so who knows. I am sure you will find more than enough to pick apart and get your revenge for all the times I yelled at you at Copeley.


---
Interviewed by Garrett Coleman '25 

Court of Petty Appeals: Student Affairs v. Law Students of the Night

Student Affairs 

v. 

Law Students of the Night 

77 U.Va 7 (2024) 


Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Jones, Demitry, & Coco, JJ., join.

Coleman, J., concurs.

Wu, J., dissents.

Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court.

In 2024, the Princeton Review ranked UVA Law second for quality of life, bumping the Law School from the number one spot that it had held for a decade. See Staci Zaretsky, Law School with the Most Competitive Students v. Law Schools with the Best Quality of Life (2024), Above the Law (July 19, 2024); Mike Fox, UVA Law Retains Top Spots in Princeton Review Rankings, UVA Law (Dec. 14, 2021). Is this suit related to the Law School’s dramatic loss at the hands of UCLA Law? I don’t know. The Court is just asking questions.[1]

The instant case comes before us on appeal from the District Court of Petty Claims.  The district court granted summary judgment against Petitioner, Student Affairs, in favor of Respondent, Law Students of the Night (LSN), a group of late-rising law students. LSN alleged that Student Affairs scheduled the monthly free breakfast at an ungodly hour which unlawfully discriminates against students who prefer to spend their mornings wasting away in bed. Relying on this Court’s extensive alimentary rights jurisprudence, see, e.g., CRONCH v. Conagra Brands, 76 U.Va 17 (2024), the district court ordered Student Affairs to extend the timeframe of the monthly breakfast to accommodate night owl students. Student Affairs appealed the district court’s order, and we now reverse and remand for further proceedings.

 

I

The facts of the case are not in dispute. The Community Breakfast is a new event at the Law School. According to Student Affairs, the event is hosted during the fall semester “on the first Wednesday of every month in Purcell Reading Room.” The inaugural Breakfast was hosted on Wednesday, September 4. The hours for the breakfast are 8 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. Students are invited to “grab & go,” selecting from an assortment of bagels, muffins, fruit, coffee, and other breakfast essentials.

Law Students of the Night submitted evidence suggesting that close to one-third of law students are still in their beds at 9:30 a.m., let alone anywhere near the Law School. Student Affairs did not dispute this evidence but naggingly reminded LSN that most of them will get much less sleep in their future careers than they do now.

LSN argued that this Court’s alimentary rights precedent requires Student Affairs to schedule the breakfast at a time that will accommodate the late-rising students. LSN correctly points out that we have “repeatedly held that students’ alimentary rights may be asserted against parties providing or consuming food at the Law School.” CRONCH v. Conagra Brands, 76 U.Va 17 (2024); see also The Funding Cases, 77 U.Va 1 (2024) (granting damages to Chief Justice Allard for medical costs incurred from consuming salty snacks from Student Affairs); Hungry People v. Law School Student Orgs, 75 U.Va. 12 (2022) (enjoining all student organizations from preventing students from eating free lunch until after events conclude); Students v. Empty Food Table, 75 U.Va. 10 (2022) (enjoining 1Ls from taking food from events hosted by organizations of which they are not members). In its motion for summary judgment, LSN argued that free food must be made available to non-1L law students on equal terms.

 

II

Against the backdrop of our overwhelmingly pro-student food rights precedent, the district court concluded that LSN’s summary judgment motion must be granted. We disagree. The right to free food is perhaps the most fundamental right of UVA Law students, and its abridgment is subject to the highest scrutiny. But in this case, it is not clear that Petitioner has violated it.

By instituting the monthly breakfast, Student Affairs has increased both the quality and quantity of free food available to law students. Petitioner points out that LSN’s claim is not so much an alimentary rights claim as it is a discrimination claim in which that right is implicated. The proper inquiry, then, is whether our anti-discrimination law should protect late-rising law students. If late-rising law students are protected, then Student Affairs may not burden their fundamental food rights absent some compelling interest.

While Student Affairs timely raised the issue of late-rising law students’ protected status before the district court, we believe the record is not sufficiently developed to render a judgment on that question. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment order and remand for further argument on this question.

It is so ordered.

 

Coleman, J., concurring in the judgment.

While I agree with the ultimate disposition of the case, I write separately to clarify two points. First, breakfast means breakfast. Anti-discrimination law does not force the owners of public accommodations to fundamentally alter their services. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 666-68 (2001). Second, late-rising law students do not constitute a protected class. It is paramount that this final conclusion be settled clearly and forcefully, so that these bums do not return to our petty court.

Merriam-Webster defines “breakfast” as “the first meal of the day . . . taken in the morning” (emphasis added) (inconvenient language omitted). As we can see, the early timeframe of the meal defines what breakfast is. Serving it later in the day would constitute a “fundamental alteration.” Id. at 637. Therefore, Student Affairs is under no such obligation. While we are of course not bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretations of anti-discrimination law, we can incorporate those opinions when expedient. See ASSES, 77 U.Va. 3 (2024) (incorporating segments of federal law when doing so furthers the bit).

To my second point, late-rising students are not a protected class. You cannot point to them in a crowd. At some stages in life, people wake up early, while in others, they sleep late. Early birds have their advantages, but so do late risers. And to the extent there is discrimination against people who choose to wake up late, that is so baked into our society that I would throw out such claims under substantive honor analysis. Put simply, people who fail to get out of bed at a reasonable hour should not be welcomed in this Court.

 

Wu, J., dissents.

I dissent from the majority’s opinion for the court’s lack of sufficient consideration as to the full meaning intended under the “alimentary rights.”

The court dismisses the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that the Student Affairs monthly breakfasts increased “both the quality and quantity of free food,” which I find both peculiar and unjustly conclusory. While the quantity element can be conceded through relative ease, the element at issue here is whether—by providing these breakfasts at unreasonable early hours—Student Affairs has missed the “quality” element of alimentary rights. I argue that the quality of free food includes both the nourishment value of the tangible items provided and the access to said items. By providing these items for such an early limited one-hour window, Student Affairs has failed to provide reasonable access to both plaintiffs and other third parties, such as those students in classes for the full-hour window.

In CRONCH v. Conagra Brands, 76 U.Va 17 (2024), the court introduced the Stomach Formula, which outlined that a party would breach alimentary rights if “the burden of improving the quality of food is less than the probability of students’ being dissatisfied times the extent of students’ hanger.” In this case, it is only mildly burdensome for the breakfast to either be moved to a slightly later window or expanded to a longer period. Thus the plaintiffs have made a case for summary judgment and the trial court should be affirmed.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.


---
tya2us@virginia.edu, jxu6ad@virginia.edu, gcu2vn@virginia.edu 

[1] Loaded questions, whose implied answers we decline to explicitly refute.

Hot Bench: Puppy

Hi Puppy, thanks so much for taking the time to be here and for biting my nose a little bit. Now I know you were adopted literally like an hour ago, but is your name really Puppy? 
Technically the nice folks at CASPCA have been calling me Emerald, but it was part of a whole gemstone bit and maybe doesn't quite fit me ~personality wise~ if you know what I mean. I'm excited for my new fam to give me a cute name! They probably already have tbh. 

True, sorry for not knowing it yet. That's my bad. 
That's ok. I'm like only a few months old so realistically it's going to take me a bit to learn it anyways. 

I'm older than you and also zone out when people use my name so don't feel bad. What's up with those ears by the way? They're phenomenal. 
Thank you, I get that a lot. All I can say is that it's all natural. I'm a walking (prancing) advertisement for adopting shelter pups, cuz I'm so frickin cute. 

God that's so true. 
I feel like the rest of this article should really just be pictures of me. 

I think you're so right. Thanks again for visiting. And not going to the bathroom anywhere. 
I am a Good Dog. 

---
Interviewed by Nicky Demitry '26 

If Tears Could Build a Staircase

Anonymous Stairs Enthusiast 
with Elizabeth Patten ’25 and Malia Takei ’25 


If tears could build a Stairway 

And our memories a lane, 

We could walk right up to Slaughter 

And climb you once again. 

No farewell words were spoken; 

No time to say goodbye. 

You were gone before we knew it, 

And only Dean Dugas knows why. 

Our hearts ache in sadness; 

Our tears overflow. 

The pleasure of walking your stairs, 

No 1Ls will ever know. 

Court of Petty Appeals: Law Students v. Miller Center

Law Students 

v. 

Miller Center 

77 U.Va 6 (2024) 


Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Jones, Demitry, & Coco, JJ., join.

 Coleman, J., dissents.

 

Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court.

 This suit comes before us on appeal from the District Court of Petty Claims. Petitioners, the collective UVA Law student body, sued the Miller Center for failing to advertise Justice Breyer’s talk scheduled for October 17. Relying on our precedent requiring events to remain open to law students, see e.g., Students for Attending Cool Events v. UVA Law Faculty, 76 U.Va 13 (2024) (enjoining the administration from excluding Law Students from events labeled as “open to faculty”), Petitioners argue that the Miller Center’s failure to adequately advertise the event to law students is a public nuisance.

After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court denied both motions, reasoning that a genuine issue of fact remained to be tried—whether any law students genuinely wanted to go in the first place. After a bench trial, the Court found that several law students were likely interested in attending the event and accordingly held the Miller Center liable for their failure to advertise the event. The Miller Center appealed, arguing that the court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous. We agree, and we accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.

 

I

As a threshold matter, we note that this Court has not previously held what standard of review applies to a lower court’s factual findings. Neither party, seemingly assuming that we follow federal practice (we do not), briefed the Court on this matter. Their oversight, while grossly incompetent, is of no import here. We believe that the District Court’s findings would not prevail even under a highly deferential standard of review. Accordingly, we will assume, without deciding, that the standard of review for the District Court’s factual findings is merely reasonableness.[1]

 

II

Justice Stephen Breyer’s speaking event at the Miller Center is scheduled for October 17. The event was first advertised to the student body in an email from Dean Kendrick, which was sent on September 24. A second university-wide Student Affairs email was sent on September 25. The event was discreetly listed in the middle of other talks at the bottom of the email. By the time the first email from Dean Kendrick was sent, in-person tickets to the event had already been sold out for almost a week. Only online tickets remained, presumably because seats had been meted out to older alumni and eager pre-law undergrads.

The Law Students took great offense to this perceived slight. Petitioners put forth testimony from law students, who generally described disappointment from being able to attend the event only virtually. Several students described feelings of exclusion and shock that law students were not prioritized for the event.

But the Law Students’ testimony did not go unrebutted. On cross-examination, none of Petitioners’ witnesses could recall a single Breyer opinion they had read. One witness even referred to him as “Stefen” Breyer.

The Miller Center also put forth evidence that a majority of law students would not even be in Charlottesville to attend the event. Respondent pointed out that the event is scheduled for the day after Fall Break, noting that the majority of law students take the whole week off instead of returning for Thursday classes. When asked about their travel itineraries for Fall Break, Petitioners’ witnesses claimed that they could not recall them or had not yet made plans.

Further, Respondent introduced evidence, scraped from students’ Instagram posts, that the only law students who had expressed interest in the event had planned to make a drinking game out of it. “Each time Justice Breyer talks about ‘liberty,’ drink. If he makes up a crazy hypothetical unprompted, finish your drink” read one post.

Despite Respondent’s complete takedown of the Law Students’ witnesses, the District Court concluded that it was “reasonably likely that some students would attend the event.” We believe this conclusion is unsupported by the evidence. We believe—and the evidence suggests—that roughly half of the student body will be out of town during Breyer’s visit. The student witnesses’ apparent unfamiliarity with Breyer’s jurisprudence further suggests that even those students who are in Charlottesville are unlikely to attend. And while the drinking game proponents’ mockery of the law is commendable, it contradicts their avowed interest in attending the event. We cannot uphold a decision that so blatantly ignores these facts.

 

III

While the District Court’s factual finding was patently wrong, we do not believe that is necessarily fatal to the students’ case. It remains to be decided whether the Miller Center has a duty to pander to law students, even if they are unlikely to attend the event. In Students for Attending Cool Events, we held that the Law School could not bar students from attending events that were advertised in The Docket because doing so would be a “bait and switch.” 76 U.Va 13. We believe it likely that the logic of S.A.C.E. applies here because the Breyer event was already sold out by the time it was advertised to law students. Similarly, Petitioners’ public nuisance claim may extend to the Miller Center’s decision to schedule the event for the day after Fall Break. Such inattentiveness to the needs of law students is perfect fodder for this Court.

Ordinarily, we would raise these arguments sua sponte and just rule in favor of the Petitioners. But there is a chance that by drawing out this litigation, the case will become mooted once the event takes place in the next few weeks. And, well, that would be pretty funny.

Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s holding and remand for further proceedings to determine whether law students need to show a likelihood of attending an event before they can establish standing to sue the event planner.

As an aside, the Law Weekly Editorial Board intervened in this suit, alleging unconstitutional interference with their reporting. They do not need to return to the District Court for reasons we decline to explain. We summarily grant their claims, with damages to be calculated based on the cost of a ticket to Miami during the week of Fall Break.

It is so ordered.

Coleman, J., dissents.

 So much of the Chief’s opinion rings true, but he fails in his disposition of the case. The proper remedy is to enjoin the entire event. Upon arrival, Justice Emeritus Breyer should be diverted to the Law School. And the keycard access points should be programmed to shock trespassing undergrads.

The fact that the University would allow pre-law undergrads to attend this event at all is appalling. I hope that Admissions has to read dozens of cringe-inducing personal statements recounting the event. That is what happens when you let those animals loose on legal events.

But the Chief Justice is also wrong on his special ruling in favor of the Law Weekly. These editors lack standing because they can theoretically access all events with the office press pass. While it does bear the name Nikolai Morse ’24, we all remember him as a generic-looking white man and could all impersonate him with a simple vest.


---
tya2us@virgina.edu 
jxu6ad@virginia.edu 

[1] As a general principle, we believe this Court has no obligation to defer to lesser courts.

Court of Petty Appeals: 2Ls and 3Ls v. The Tiny Staircase

2Ls and 3Ls
v.
The Tiny Staircase
77 U.Va 5 (2024)


Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Jones, Demitry, & Coco, JJ., join.

Coleman, J., dissents.


Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court.

 This class action tort suit is brought before us by 2Ls and 3Ls who allege that they were falsely imprisoned by the new staircase in Slaughter Hall.[1] Plaintiffs contend that the stairway and doors are too narrow to accommodate the flow of students in between classes. It is so narrow, Plaintiffs claim, that it behaves “basically like a one-way street.” Pls.’ Aff. 1, para. 12.

The Tiny Staircase[2] filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a petty claim. Tiny Staircase argues that no reasonable juror could find that it is too narrow to accommodate the Law School’s traffic. Tiny Staircase also notes that there are multiple access points to the second floor of Slaughter Hall. Tiny Staircase thus argues that, to the extent that there are traffic problems in the Tiny Staircase, Plaintiffs’ injury is self-inflicted, as an obvious alternative remedy exists. Finally, Tiny Staircase argues that Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim must fail because they were not completely confined but merely obstructed.

We are unpersuaded by all of Tiny Staircase’s arguments and accordingly deny their motion to dismiss. 

I

As we noted in In re Staircase, the lovely original Slaughter Hall stairwell was recently lost to a disgraceful and heinous act of destruction. See The Funding Cases, 77 U.Va 1 (2024) (“Under cover of summer break, the administration laid waste to the elegant and stately passage at the front of Slaughter Hall. In its place is nothing but a Stalinesque wall.”). This Court is committed to vindicating its destruction.

The defendant staircase argues that no reasonable juror would find the Tiny Staircase too narrow. In doing so, Defendant attempts to fit a factual argument into a motion contending legal insufficiency. Such legal sloppiness is only tolerated by this Court when we already agree with the movant. Plaintiffs allege that the doorway is “roughly three feet across.” Pls.’ Aff. 1, para. 5. The average shoulder width of an adult ranges from fourteen to seventeen inches. While two adult individuals thus could fit through the three-foot wide doorway, there is naturally a need for some degree of personal space. The appropriate degree of personal space is a classic reasonableness question that is best reserved for a jury. Accordingly, we believe that the Tiny Staircase’s ability to accommodate Law School traffic is a question best resolved by the jury.

II

We now move to the Tiny Staircase’s argument that the existence of alternative stairwells prevents Plaintiffs from bringing this claim. Tiny Staircase misunderstands Plaintiffs’ argument and this Court’s precedent. Plaintiffs’ theory of harm includes an allegation that the Tiny Staircase slows their travel to and from classes, thus resulting in tardiness. In many instances, alternative stairwells will be an inadequate remedy for this injury due to their location at the far end of Slaughter Hall. The Tiny Staircase is the only access point in the middle of Slaughter Hall.

Regardless, Defendant is foolish to think we would dismiss this case on remedy exhaustion grounds. We balk at such procedural nonsense. We would much rather get to the substance of the case. See PRCP 17(a) (“All procedure and no substance makes the Court write dull opinions.”). 

III

Lastly, the Tiny Staircase argues that Plaintiffs have misconstrued the false imprisonment tort. They note that a claim of false imprisonment is made only if the claimant’s “confinement within the boundaries fixed by the actor [is] complete.” Restatement 2d of Torts § 35. Here, Plaintiffs have only argued that they were slowed by the boundaries fixed by the Defendant. Plaintiffs were thus never confined, as a reasonable means of escape was always available to them.

While Tiny Staircase is perhaps correct that the Restatement does not support Plaintiffs’ legal theory, this Court has never let doctrine stand in the way of a good time. We believe that 2Ls and 3Ls, who are very busy golfing and planning how to spend their summer money, may adequately state a claim for false imprisonment if they are merely delayed by a defendant, rather than completely confined. We have no qualms about the potential for this holding to result in a slew of litigation about undue delays. Sounds really petty. We’re into that.

In sum, we find the Tiny Staircase’s arguments unavailing. Accordingly, we shall DENY their motion to dismiss. In the meantime, we encourage Plaintiffs to cook up some arguments that will allow us to order the administration to reinstate the old stairs. Long live Slaughter Hall.

It is so ordered.

Coleman, J., dissenting.

 I dissent for two independent reasons. First, 2Ls and 3Ls lack standing based on the pleaded injury. Second, the Tiny Staircase offers some benefits, which I think amount to an affirmative defense to wrongful imprisonment.

With respect to standing, the majority asserts that the plaintiffs are harmed because they are late to class. That is no cognizable injury for upperclassmen! 1L is done for these people. The time for relaxation has arrived. To think that they should be concerned with arriving to class on time is ridiculous. The plaintiffs did also brief on third-party standing through 1Ls, but I find their arguments unconvincing. First, 1Ls rarely have classes in Slaughter. And second, they are free to litigate cases themselves. While they would almost certainly lose, that is not a sufficient bar to the assertion of their rights such that they would need surrogate plaintiffs.

And I would have used our common law powers to create a new affirmative defense for false imprisonment within our jurisdiction: offsetting benefits. It is no secret that this Court is rather blasé when ruling in tort. See Ex parte Undergrad, 77 U.Va. 4 (2024) (“If there is an undergraduate studying in our library, any law student, even a 1L, may imprison him within the Law School . . . .”). So, the concept of an affirmative defense to false imprisonment is nothing too offensive. And the benefits of Tiny Staircase are clear: People have to take things slowly and catch up with their fellow law students while waiting to access the stairs after class. Those little moments are what makes UVA special.

Finally, I would like to devote some space to a public attack on this Court’s Chief Justice (something I expect to see in the coming SCOTUS terms). This entire opinion is based on an idea that I already had and already wrote on. See In re Staircase. Not only is this joke theft, but it is redundant within the Law Weekly’s 77th edition. This malicious yet incompetent incident is perfectly consistent with the Chief Justice’s tenure.

---
tya2us@virgina.edu 
jxu6ad@virginia.edu 

[1] Plaintiffs did not admit 1Ls to the class because, they explain, they were concerned that the inclusion of 1Ls could lead to an adverse ruling. See Liberals Who Are Bad at Using Canva v. Federalist Society at UVA Law, 76 U.Va 4 (2023) (“1Ls always lose.”). We applaud their wise decision.

[2] Attorneys’ for the Tiny Staircase strenuously objected to us referring to their client as “Tiny Staircase” and asked that we instead use “Mx. Slaughter Stairwell.” Defendant’s request is (obviously) denied. See PRCP 1 (“We do what we want.”); PRCP 3 (“The funniest outcome must necessarily prevail”).

Hot Bench: Alex Wilfert '25

Hi Alex! Thank you for joining us for Hot Bench this week. To start us off, can you tell us a bit about yourself—where you’re from, what year you are, all that good stuff.

I am a 2L from Seattle, Washington by way of London, England. That’s the skinny version of that


You’re not going to mention New York and California ties?

Go Bears, I went to UC Berkeley, so four years in the Bay. Four years in New York, was born in New Jersey but we’re not going to talk about that one.


Wait, I didn’t know that—this is a new Alex tidbit I’m learning. How has 2L been treating you?

2L has been good. 2L has been a lot more relaxing because I know the pace of everything. It has definitely been nice after a summer away to see some friends, like Ashanti.


Aww too kind, do you want to plug your softball team?

Ooh yea, got a great team going, Slug Slug Goose. We’re flying high this semester, we’re going for the championship this year.


Do you guys think you’re going to bring it home?

Definitely going to bring it home, zero doubt.


Okay, we’ll have to do a check-in post-season interview. How was your summer—where were you, what were you up to?

Summer was great. I managed to put 6,000 miles on my car in less than two months. I was between Charlottesville, Richmond, and Washington D.C. I was working at the Virginia Office of the Attorney General in Richmond. I love it in Virginia, and I want to stay in Virginia, so it was nice to serve the Commonwealth for a bit, and Richmond is a cool city. With all the craziness of recruiting, I was up in D.C. a lot and I met my girlfriend up there, so I was there for her too. Then, I came back to Charlottesville to visit.


Have you gotten an oil change yet? It sounds like you need one. Do you know where you’re going next summer?

No, I have not, I should though. Also, to add I really liked Richmond even though someone warned me about Richmond—


I think I gave appropriate warnings.[1]

And I am going to Latham & Watkins in D.C. to do litigation work next summer.


Are you excited?

I’m super excited. I got the chance to meet a ton of Latham attorneys over the school year and I really liked the people and the office culture from my conversations. They are also an international firm, which was really key for me. I am very excited to go to D.C.


Have you found housing in D.C. yet?

No, just starting to figure that out. I’m trying to secure a roommate for next summer right now.


Best of luck with the housing search! For our 1L readers, what is one piece of advice you wished you had 1L fall?

Trust yourself before you trust anyone else. You’re going to have a hundred people trying to give you advice, but you know what works for you in terms of studying and healthy habits, so just have belief in yourself that everything will work out. Just maintain whatever routine or positive habits you already have going, and the rest will follow.


I think that’s very nice and very true. Okay, now a lighting round. I’m going to do a little fall edition. Chili with beans or without?

I don’t like chili generally.


Ooh, hot take! Football or no football?

The real football, as in soccer. Otherwise, go Hawks.


What is your favorite fall snack?

I have to be honest; I do like a pumpkin spice latte.


Those are good, I don’t understand the hate. What’s the superior fall holiday—Halloween or Thanksgiving?

Thanksgiving, Halloween is for heathens.


Do you have your Halloween costume yet?

One is in the works, stay tuned.

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Interviewed by: : Ashanti Jones ’26

[1] I’m from the Richmond area, so this is not Richmond slander.

Court of Petty Appeals: Ex Parte Undergrad

Ex Parte Undergrad
77 U.Va 4 (2024)


Coleman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Coco, Jones, Demitry, & Allard, JJ., join.
Allard, C.J., concurs.

Coleman, J., delivers the opinion of the Court.

This Court has been asked to grant a writ of habeas corpus to the undergraduate student who is currently imprisoned in the Law Weekly office. We decline to offer him any relief and accordingly uphold the constitutionality of his confinement. If there is an undergraduate student studying in our library, any law student, even a 1L, may imprison him within the Law School until an Honor tribunal is prepared to hear his case.  

I

This case began on a calm Sunday evening. The library was packed with nervous 1Ls who were working furiously. But something seemed off at one of the tables in the gunner pit. Four younger-looking students were giggling, and they looked suspiciously happy. So, one member of the Law Weekly staff and current 1L, who shall remain nameless, approached the table to gather more information. But she was taken aback by the screens in front of her. They were all studying anatomy, a subject that no self-respecting law student would ever engage with. Shouting ensued. Weapons were drawn. And amid the chaos, the Law Weekly reporter was able to subdue and hog-tie one of the undergraduates. She then dragged him back and handcuffed him to the refrigerator in the Law Weekly office, where he has remained since.

Subsisting on nothing but leftover pizza and beer, this undergraduate student learned enough to file this habeas petition. He seeks immediate relief from his unlawful detention. He claims that he is not a flight risk, and has been so traumatized by his experience in the Law School that he will never again step foot on North Grounds. 

II

This case forces us to deal with an issue of first impression in this Court. What rights does an undergrad have in relation to the lowly 1L? It goes without saying that 1Ls always lose. See, e.g., Virginia v. Harvard L. Rev. Ass’n, 76 U.Va 4 (2023) (“1Ls must always lose.”); see also Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake, 75 U.Va 16 (2023) (Lake, C.J., concurring) (“1Ls may have rights when it is funnier for them to win . . . .”). But as far as the clerks of this Court are aware, that principle is only promulgated in cases where 1Ls are pitted against 2Ls or 3Ls. Surely, the rights calculus must change when the adverse party has not even taken the LSAT.

This Court is of the opinion that our jurisprudence must give way to evolving circumstances. The law of the land is that 1Ls always lose when they assert rights against more advanced law students. We are not unaware of the arguments against this. At the beginning of their studies, 1Ls are little more than undergrads. They often exhibit the same personal foibles common to undergrads. But the key difference is that they have successfully taken the LSAT, thereby demonstrating some potential for the legal reasoning that differentiates us from the laity.  

III

While this new articulation of the 1L rule establishes a massive presumption against granting this writ, there is still work to be done on the merits. It is still conceivable that it is funnier for the undergraduate to win.

The petitioner alleges that this confinement violates his rights to substantive and procedural due process. While The Constitution does not govern our petty jurisdiction, we are bound by substantive honor analysis. See Students for Fair Socialization v. Student Bar Association, 76 U.Va. 2 (2023) (“Our constitutional order was fundamentally changed when the Honor System was established in 1842. And with that, the Framers protected some inalienable rights by putting them outside of the Honor Code’s ambit.”). The petitioner contends that the basic right to liberty is protected by substantive honor because it is not addressed in the three pillars of the Honor Code. But this argument is unavailing.

The Honor Code expressly prohibits stealing. The use of space in our Law School by uninvited third parties is a form of stealing. Therefore, no right of the undergraduate captive was violated when he was taken to the Law Weekly office, in the same way that no right is violated when a murderer is arrested by the police.

There is a final question as to whether the 1L was the proper authority to arrest this undergrad. Based on this Court’s recent holding in ASSES, regular law students have the power to enforce criminal provisions. Aggrieved Students Seeking E-Mail Solutions v. Univ. of Virginia Information Technology Services, 77 U.Va. 3 (2024) (“[W]e believe [that allowing private criminal enforcement] is consistent with this Court’s commitment to vindicating the public’s petty disputes.”). Following this precedent, there is no question that a law student can take petty enforcement into her own hands.

The undergrads lose on the merits. The undergrads lose on humor. They have failed in every respect to rebut the presumption against them, even when facing a 1L captor. Law students may detain undergrads with impunity before their Honor trials when they trespass on North Grounds. However, the 1L must be transferred to the proper Honor authorities when it is time for a full adjudication, in the interest of comity with the larger institution.

This petition for the writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. Costs are awarded to the 1L respondent.

Allard, C.J., concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court because it correctly holds that law students—including 1Ls—may arrest undergraduates trespassing on North Grounds. As the majority ably explains, our decision in ASSES enables law students to enforce the Honor Code against undergrads. This result is also consistent with this Court’s commitment to the bit. See Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake, 75 U.Va 16 (2023) (Lake, C.J., concurring) (“There is nothing more vital to the exercise of justice than committing to the bit.”). Pitting the 1Ls—no doubt chomping at the bit to try out this “law stuff” they’re learning about—against undergraduate interlopers is priceless.

But I would go further and hold that undergraduate students do not have standing to bring a habeas petition in the first place. “Oh, but Mr. Chief Justice Allard, that issue wasn’t briefed by either of the parties!!” God my clerks are annoying. Who hired you anyway?

The Court of Petty Appeals is not bound by such impotent philosophies as “judicial restraint.” Instead, the Court should answer the question we were all thinking: Do undergraduates possess any rights that law students are bound to respect? The answer is surely no. This Court has previously described undergraduates as “bad,” Class of 2021 v. Doe, 903 U.Va 12 (2018) (Schmalzl, J., concurring),  “annoying,” Remote Students v. Student Records, 73 U.Va 11 (2020) (citing Annoyer), and disease-spreading, Law Students for Fall Break v. The Law School, 73 U.Va 7 (2020). Should this Court be an open forum to such individuals? You be the judge. Just kidding, I’m the judge. And I say no.

I would hold that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is permanently and inherently suspended as to undergraduate students. If someday, a case arises where it would be exceptionally funny to grant a victory to an undergrad, perhaps we will hear their arguments. But we need not do so here.


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jxu6ad@virginia.edu 

Hot Bench: Alice Abrokwa

Good morning, Profes­sor Abrokwa. Thank you for taking the time to talk with me today! We’re ex­cited to have you join the UVA Law faculty, and I’m very much enjoying your class thus far. Maybe we can start with a little bit about where you’re from and how you are liking Charlottesville so far.

Yeah, so I’ve been living in DC for the past ten years. I went there because I knew it would be a good place to practice public interest work, so I spent the time at various nonprofits and at the federal government. I’ve worked at the Department of Justice in the past, and most recently I was coming from the Department of Educa­tion, all doing civil rights work. Before that, I lived in Richmond, and people told me to expect Charlottesville to be a little like Richmond which has been the case so far. I grew up in a pretty small college town too, so there’s a lot that’s famil­iar to me here from my life growing up.

I saw that you were previously a fellow with the Harvard Law School Project on Disability and a senior counsel at the U.S. Department of Educa­tion. Can you tell us a lit­tle more about those past work experiences?

The fellowship was really my own research and en­gagement with other schol­ars around disability civil rights issues. My work at the Department of Educa­tion was on education civil rights, but most of that looked like disability civil rights too. My first job af­ter clerking was focused on children with mental health disabilities, making sure they had the support they needed to do well in school and that they had home and community-based mental health care. So, most of my expertise has been focused on children with disabili­ties. I did that work at the Department of Education most recently working on drafting regulations. The Department’s regulations that protect students from disability discrimination haven’t been updated in a generation, so I spent a long time working on those regs and then separately my own scholarship through the pro­gram with Harvard.

What inspired you to transition from practicing to teaching?

I knew I liked the kind of writing you get to do as a scholar. When you write as a lawyer for a client or even a government agency, it’s not your voice, it’s not your perspective, but when you engage in legal scholarship you get to articulate your own views. They don’t have to be tied to particular facts, they don’t have to be within the limits of what makes sense for your case or the jurisdiction of the office that you work in. I found it really liberating to think through legal questions and problems that maybe don’t often arise in practice but are still interesting to me. I’ve also lectured over the years at various law schools in the D.C. area and had a lot of fun meeting with stu­dents in that capacity. Last­ly, I’ve done all public in­terest since I graduated law school and there’s a strong pay-it-forward mentality. I benefited a lot from people who were willing to give me career advice, and I spent a lot of my time out of law school giving advice to law students or recent grads. So, I just had the realization at some point that being a law professor combines every­thing that I already know I like: the scholarship piece, mentoring and advising stu­dents, and the actual teach­ing part has been really fun.

Speaking of advising, do you have any advice for students who are inter­ested in a career in public service?

I think the number one concern I’ve heard from people is that it’s hard to get a job in public inter­est and also manage your loans. That’s a real consid­eration for a lot of people. I participated in public service loan forgiveness programs, both at my law school and the federal pro­gram. I wouldn’t have been able to do public interest if it hadn’t been for those programs. I was able to do fellowships at non-profits that wouldn’t have had the money on their own to pay my salary. So that’s a realistic option, and I hope that people consider it. The other thing that I will say is you can still do work that serves the pub­lic from a firm. There are lots of smaller law firms in the DC area that have civil rights practices and they’re really robust. A lot of them are staffed by people who were former government attorneys, civ­il rights attorneys, defend­ers, and prosecutors, so if you want to do that kind of work you can do that at a firm too. The last option I’d say is government law­yering positions. They can be a bit more stable, they pay a little bit better than some nonprofits, and a lot of states have honors attor­neys programs. So, don’t be discouraged if you are wor­ried about paying for your loans or finances in pursu­ing public interest. There are ways to make it happen!

You mentioned that you are teaching a course called Pain and the Law in the spring. Can you give a sneak peek at some of the topics that will be dis­cussed in the course?

The idea behind the Pain and the Law class is to think about different contexts where the law regulates the experience of pain. There are some contexts where the law authorizes the infliction of pain on someone else. Coming from the school and health perspective that I do, you could think about restraint or seclusion of the student or corporal punish­ment as an infliction of pain, but there are also plenty of examples in the criminal le­gal context too. So, the law allows the infliction of pain in one context, but also cre­ates a remedy for the expe­rience of pain, like pain and suffering damages or repa­rations. The idea behind the class is to tease out what the law does with pain when it forces someone to endure it and authorizes that inflic­tion, and when it creates a remedy for it.

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Interviewed by Alicia Kaufmann '27 

Court of Petty Appeals: Aggrieved Students Seeking E-mail Solutions v. University of Virginia Information Technology Services

Aggrieved Students Seeking E-mail Solutions
v.
University of Virginia Information Technology Services
77 U.Va 3 (2024)


Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the court, in which Coco, Jones, & Demitry, JJ., join.

 Coleman & Allen, JJ., dissent.

Allard, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Factual Background

UVA Information Technology Services (“ITS”) appealed a criminal conviction from the District Court of Petty Complaints for violation of the Comstock Act. ITS was convicted under charges brought by a private group of students, Aggrieved Students Seeking E-mail Solutions (“ASSES”). ASSES pressed charges against ITS under the theory that the “randomly-generated” usernames that ITS assigned them were obscene and that by sending students their IDs via email, ITS had violated the Comstock Act. This Court, having the utmost dignity, will not reprint the foul usernames at issue in the pages of its reports.[1]

The district court found ITS guilty on all counts, noting that ASSES’s first impressions in emails to professors and future employers were irreversibly tainted by ITS’s offense. ITS now appeals the lower court’s conviction on three grounds: that private prosecutions are unlawful and prejudicial; that the Comstock Act is void under the vagueness doctrine; and that the usernames are randomly-generated and not obscene.

I

We begin with the propriety of ASSES, a private party, initiating a criminal action. ITS objects that private prosecutions are unlawful, procedurally unfair, and prejudicial to the defendant. ITS filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges on these grounds in the lower court and appeals that motion now.

Firstly, ITS errs in bringing a procedural argument before this Court. As experienced petty practitioners know: “We do what we want.” PRCP 1. But, whatever, we’ll throw you a bone.

ITS correctly notes that private prosecutions have been barred by federal law for decades. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). But the Court of Petty Appeals is not bound by the holdings of lesser federal jurists. Moreover, Linda R.S. is inapplicable here. The Comstock Act at issue in this case is not a federal law; it is an identical law adopted by the Petty Congress.[2]

Accordingly, whether private individuals have standing to bring a criminal action is an issue of first impression for this Court. Though defendant ITS characterizes private prosecutions as procedurally unfair and prejudicial, several U.S. states still allow private citizens a limited right to initiate prosecutions. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 99 Idaho 511, 584 P.2d 1236 (1978). Though these states appear to be a minority, we believe their approach is consistent with this Court’s commitment to vindicating the public’s petty disputes. See PRCP 8 (“The more, the pettier.”). Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in denying ITS’s motion to dismiss. 

II

We now turn to ITS’s challenge under the vagueness doctrine. The federal Comstock Act, upon which the petty Comstock Act is modeled, has repeatedly survived challenges on vagueness grounds. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 97 S. Ct. 1756, 52 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1977). The relevant language of the Comstock Act is as follows:

 “Whoever . . . knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier . . . for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy . . . writing . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . . .”

 In other words, don’t mail anything that a judge or jury might think is “obscene.” How much clearer could it be? Can’t you read?

III

Lastly, we turn to ITS’s argument that because the usernames are randomly-generated, ITS lacked the requisite “knowledge of the contents” of the obscene material. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 121. In the alternative, ITS argues that the usernames at issue are not obscene.

We find ITS’s arguments unavailing. Firstly, their claim that the usernames were merely random accidents is contradicted by an email exchange in which an ITS representative acknowledged to an aggrieved student: “Oh yeah, we noticed that and figured it’d be OK.” ITS cannot now claim it was unaware of the username’s character, even if it was randomly generated.

As to the issue of obscenity, we noted at the outset that the usernames at issue are too obscene to dirty the pages of this opinion. And we believe it uncontroversial that these profane usernames “lack[] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Accordingly, we decline to disturb the lower court’s application of the Miller test.

All of ITS’s arguments on appeal fail. We shall again note, as the trial court did, the severe pettiness of ITS’s offense. ASSES, without their consent, were assigned humiliating and demeaning usernames because of ITS’s policy. Such a petty injustice demands restitution, and this Court will grant it. The holding of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Coleman, J., dissenting.

My disagreement is categorical. Therefore, I dissent from each part of Chief Justice Allard’s opinion, and provide my takedowns in the same order. The Court today holds that 1Ls with humorous emails are entitled to justice, in plain contravention of bedrock precedent. See Law Weekly v. Swarm of Murderous Bees, 77 U.Va. 2 (2024) (noting “this Court’s repeated holding that 1Ls always lose”). It has contradicted Pet. R. Civ. P. 3 (“The funniest outcome must necessarily prevail.”). And it has revived obscenity law from an era in which Supreme Court justices would have to watch pornography together. See Katie Zezima, Why Ted Cruz Watched Pornography with Supreme Court Justices, Wash. Post, (June 29, 2015) (“Oh my.”). Living up to the name of this institution, the Chief Justice has fashioned himself a petty tyrant.  

I

The Chief Justice begins his opinion with the notion that private citizens can bring criminal actions in this Court. Perhaps that could be true in the abstract, but petitioner has not come close to exhausting its remedies. Where was the suit asking for injunctive relief against the school officials? Where was the suit asking for monetary damages from the negative employer reactions? Because of this opinion, every new petty plaintiff will append criminal charges to their already-bloated complaints. And given that the Chief Justice and I already write half of this paper, we do not need more work.            

II

Perhaps the most concerning element of Chief Justice Allard’s opinion is his reliance on the Comstock Act. In line with his ultra-conservative colleagues, the Chief Justice is trying to revive this dormant federal statute to limit access to medical abortion. See Emily Bazelon, How a 150-Year-Old Law Against Lewdness Became a Key to the Abortion Fight, N.Y. Times (May 16, 2023). He just wants to soft launch it on a case, like this one, that will have broad popular appeal.

The Comstock Act is plainly vague under current federal precedent. “It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits.” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (citations omitted). How is the ordinary person supposed to know what is considered “filthy” by Victorian standards when I am allowed to attend law school classes in birkenstocks?

Moreover, the Chief Justice fails in statutory interpretation. The law criminalizes the use of a common carrier to transport obscene materials. The 1828 online version of Webster’s dictionary defines “carriage” as: “the act of carrying, bearing, transporting, or conveying; as the carriage of sounds.” Noah Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828), https://webstersdictionary1828.com/. So, the law does not criminalize the mode of transportation. What would be criminal is if the emails were used to disseminate lewd content. But the fact that the emails are themselves lewd is no cause for criminal liability.

III

My correct statutory interpretation applies with equal force in this section. But there is the additional issue of the Chief Justice assigning knowledge to an entity based on the statements of a random employee. An analogous concept in securities law is corporate scienter. “Where a defendant is a corporation, this requires pleading facts that give rise to ‘a strong inference that someone whose intent could be imputed to the corporation acted with the requisite scienter.’” Jackson v. Abernathy, 960 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Some random employee does not provide the necessary “connective tissue” to infer that the entire ITS organization should be criminally liable. Id. at 99. Yet another reason why the Chief Justice was drunk when he wrote this opinion.

ITS, you have my sympathy. 1Ls should be forced to apply to jobs with obscene, randomly-generated emails. It is the UVA way.

Allen, J., dissenting

I write in dissent not out of callous disregard for the plight of those who come to this Court for recompense. Instead, the 1Ls in question lack standing because they have suffered no injury fairly traceable to ITS (which they have yet to learn about, in their defense). Rather, they have an alternative remedy readily available to avoid using their perverse emails—an email alias.[3] This allows anyone, not just these unfortunate souls, to create and use an alternative email address rather than that which is assigned to them by default.[4] As such, the continued use of the obscene email addresses is an injury which is purely self-inflicted.

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cmz4bx@virginia.edu 

[1] Okay, maybe just a little. Among the filthy emails were bjs4me and fuc8kw.

[2] With identical case law interpreting it. Please just incorporate this into your belief system.

[3] See UVA Email Aliases, https://virginia.service-now.com/its?id=itsweb_kb_article&sys_id=acad334bdb3ac744f032f1f51d961941.

[4] At least, I think it does. I have vague recollections of looking at this as a 1L, a lifetime ago, and it still seems to exist. No reliance interest can be claimed if I am mistaken, as I have judicial immunity for my statements.

Hot Bench: William Lee '27

William! Thank you very much for joining me for the Hot Bench this week. It’s really great to have you. So, tell me a little bit about yourself. Where are you from and where did you go to undergrad?

Thank you, Brad! My name is William Lee. I was born and raised in Anchorage, Alaska and I went to the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor for undergrad, as well as a master’s degree. I’ve progressively kept moving a little further east and a little further south.

You’ve started the great crescent of migration . . .  what did you study at Michigan?

My undergrad was a Bachelor of Business Administration, and I followed that up with a Master of Accounting at the same institution. I learned the nuts and bolts of financial and tax accounting, as well as gained an introduction to operations, to finance, and to business law. This helped drive my decision to come to law school—to learn the interplay between law and business and to find my place in it. 

That’s good stuff. What compelled you to leave Alaska and head to the great state of Michigan?

Alaska has several good local schools, but I always knew in my heart that I wanted to leave and go see the country, meet people from across the United States. I applied everywhere, coast to coast and a lot of places in between. I had never even been to the Midwest before I signed the offer to go to Michigan. They had people from all fifty states, and it felt like a place where I could thrive. It felt right in my heart to say Go Blue.

We’re in the same section, and your introductory “fun fact” was that through Alaska public schools, you participated in extracurricular competitive miming. Can you tell me a little about that?

Sure! I competed and performed as a mime for three years in High School. Alaska is the only state that has pantomime as an event competition. We have long winters, and mime was a great way to tell stories during the months of darkness. I was a member of the debate team, and drama events were incorporated into the same tournaments, as we’re a smaller community, so initially it was a way for me to fill time between debate rounds. But I connected with the art form and found two other guys to mime with, and together we performed awesome stories, such as a bank robbery with a car chase. It was a lot of fun!

OK, now the lightning round! What is your perfect weekend?

My perfect weekend starts with a board game night. I like to meet my friends outside of class, play some cards, play some Settlers of Catan. I’d like to follow it up with a local hike, maybe in Shenandoah. I think time outdoors helps ground us. And then I like to start Sunday with a great brunch. Nothing is better than black coffee and an omelet in my eyes, best accompanied with the local paper, the Virginia Law Weekly.

Ha, thanks for the plug! What’s a movie adaptation they haven’t made yet, but you want to see?

Now that is a fascinating question. I really enjoyed a fantasy series known as The Dresden Files. It’s about a detective wizard in modern-day Chicago who solves cases and makes an impact on both magical and non-magical communities. I came across it when I was getting back into reading for fun during the Covid years of college. It brought me joy and showed me how unconventional thinking and magical intuition can help people with real-world problems.

I also read The Dresden Files. I would love an adaptation of that. Which piece of public art at the Law School is your favorite?

My favorite piece is the big painting with the sheep on it [Follow the Leader by John Borden Evans, in Brown Hall]. I like its natural beauty, and I think it helps us question whether we too are sheep.

Very philosophical, I like that answer! OK, last question. What is your favorite experience at the Law School so far?

I’ve loved pretty much every second of it. I think probably the first weekend. We’d had three days of classes, and that Friday I had four of my section mates over at my apartment, and we were playing euchre. After six years in the Midwest, I wanted to kick back, play some cards, and make new friends. And when we were in between hands, I remember thinking, “We’ve got three full years ahead of us. I can’t believe we’re in Virginia. It’s such a privilege to be here.” In that moment I felt right in my decision to come here, and that these are going to be lasting friendships and relationships. It’s an awesome thing to experience.


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Interviewed by Brad Berklich '27