Court of Petty Appeals: Intoxicated Student Association v. University of Virginia
Intoxicated Student Association v. University of Virginia
77 U.Va 18 (2025)
Coʟᴇᴍᴀɴ, J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Dᴇᴍɪᴛʀʏ, C.J., and Wᴜ, Bᴇʀᴋʟɪᴄʜ, and Vᴀɴɢᴇʀ, JJ., join.
Aʟʟᴀʀᴅ, C.J. Emeritus, concurs.
Aʟʟᴇɴ, J., dissents.
Bᴇᴄᴋᴇʀ, J., dissents.
Coʟᴇᴍᴀɴ, J., delivering the opinion of the court.
The Intoxicated Student Association (“ISA”) brings this putative class action lawsuit under a novel theory of dram shop law. They seek recovery for self-inflicted injuries to themselves and their reputations after the University served them alcohol at this year’s Barristers’ Ball. But the University will not go down so easily. They point out that the Commonwealth of Virginia does not even have a dram shop law; that these plaintiffs are not innocent third parties injured by overserved guests of the University, but the willingly overserved parties themselves; and that these types of reputational harms have never been compensable under dram shop laws. We reject each argument in turn and hold that ISA states valid cause of action. In so doing, we exercise our common law powers to impose liability on a university when it overserves its students, causing them to embarrass themselves.
I
The facts of this case are straightforward. Many law students attended this year’s Barristers’ Ball and had a wonderful time. Many law students were having so good a time that they felt impelled to make repeated trips to the open bar. As a result, some of those students were viciously hungover the next day; others had awkward conversations with their law school crushes; and still more pulled muscles from dancing too hard while under the influence. All such incidents were made worse by the open bar policy in place at Barristers’ Ball. These affected students now make up the putative class through which ISA brings this suit as representative.
In the Petty trial court, the University moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The trial judge stated: “If the law students did not like the consequences of their actions, then maybe they should reconsider their life choices.” While we ordinarily like to keep relations with the lower courts civil, this ridiculous statement could be grounds for impeachment.
II
It is no secret that this cause of action would not be entertained in many courts. See Robinson v. Matt Mary Moran, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 559, 562 (Va. 2000) (“The common law considers the act of selling alcoholic beverages as too remote to be a proximate cause of an injury to a third party resulting from the negligent conduct of the purchaser of the beverages.”). Were this case filed in a Virginia state court or the Western District, it would not survive. But this Court has independent jurisdiction and an even more independent common law.
More significantly, this Court has shown deference to law students in alcohol-related matters. See Students for Fair Socialization v. Student Bar Association, 76 U.Va. 2 (2023). In that case, we entered an injunction compelling the continuance of bar reviews even though there had been a recent rise in Covid-19 cases at the Law School. Id. Using this Court’s well-accepted substantive honor analysis, we held: “The rights to inebriation and socialization are codified within substantive honor as if they were explicitly granted rights.” Id.
Using Students for Fair Socialization as a foundation, this Court is comfortable imposing a modified dram shop law within its jurisdiction. Necessarily accompanying this is an implied right of action to sue for damages sustained after being overserved at a University-provided open bar. If the University and Law School would not like to take this risk, then they should not host events with open bars. We reserve for a later day whether or not that would be constitutional—in all honesty, we would likely enjoin such a move, so the University is stuck between paying massive sums in damages and being held in Petty contempt.
III
With our new common law in mind, we turn to the case at hand. These students suffered cognizable harms in part because of the open bar. They are therefore entitled to relief. When calculating damages, the lower court must assume that the plaintiff-students had pristine reputations before the night in question. It is so ORDERED.
Aʟʟᴀʀᴅ, C.J. Emeritus, concurring.
I concur with Mr. Justice Coleman’s holding in this case, but I believe he has missed an opportunity to extract a bribe from the Plaintiffs. This grave judicial error should not be overlooked, so I write separately to highlight it.
We have previously held that, under the canon of uncomical avoidance, the Court must rely on humor in rendering its judgments. See Virginia Law Review v. Virginia Journal of International Law, 76 U.Va 3 (2023) (“It is the well-established practice of this Court to avoid dispositions of a case that are based on legal reasoning rather than humor.”); Office of Private Practice v. Public Interest Law Association, 77 U.Va 10 (2024) (noting that common law fraud is only compensable if such compensation would be funny).
The canon of uncomical avoidance is further supported by PRCP 3’s requirement that “The funniest outcome must necessarily prevail.” See also Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake, 75 U.Va 16 (2023) (Lake, C.J., concurring) (“There is nothing more vital to the exercise of justice than committing to the bit.”).
I do not mean to suggest that Justice Coleman’s opinion is unfunny. Far from it. Making the University pay for our drunk fuck-ups is hilarious. But in remedying drunken law students’ reputational injuries, I worry that the Court risks reducing the availability of gossip, rumors, photos, and video from the Law School’s more debaucherous events.
I would hold that to avail themselves of our newly created dram shop law, plaintiffs must submit to the Court of Petty Appeals all embarrassing text messages, photos, videos, Instagram stories, etc. that caused their reputational damages. These would be submitted to the justices in camera and would not need to be shared with the trial court judge. The justices could then publicly disclose the submissions to the extent that humor demands it.
If I did not make it clear during my time as Chief Justice, I will make it clear now: We are not above being bribed. Seriously, we’d love it. Ethics, shmethics—everyone else is doing it! Send me your funny video, and maybe we’ll give you a better ruling. And hurry up. I’m graduating soon! I want my bribe while I still hold this office and the immense, unchecked power that comes with it.
Aʟʟᴇɴ, J., dissenting.
Even Homer nods, and this esteemed Court has unwittingly erred in a fundamental manner which necessitates a response. The plaintiffs here, all law students, allege reputational harms, which of course begs the question—what reputation? It is an undisputed fact that law students are among God’s biggest mistakes and basest creatures, perhaps second only to lawyers themselves, and are generally reviled even amongst their own kind. As such, I would extend the “libel-proof” plaintiff doctrine, which bars recovery where alleged defamation “cannot realistically cause impairment of reputation because the person's reputation is already so low,” to the circumstances at hand. Guccione v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, insofar as plaintiffs allege any reputational harms, I would consider this motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and grant in favor of the University.
Bᴇᴄᴋᴇʀ, J., dissenting.
This Court was chartered with the unique directive to decide cases purely based on pettiness. Implicit in this directive is the Court’s obligation to foster and promote pettiness. The majority neglected this obligation when it failed to consider the impact of its decision on the Law School’s Shenanigans Quotient. Holding the Law School liable will undeniably result in increased precautions by the Law School to prevent such debauchery in the future. This cannot stand. Students for Attending Cool Events astutely noted in their amicus brief that precautions by the Law School are inversely proportional to the Law School’s Shenanigans Quotient, which has already dipped to dangerously low levels in recent years. Shenanigans are a fundamental catalyst for school-wide pettiness. Drunken confessions and awkward, highly public interactions are the seeds of feuds that could fester for years. Any decision undermining shenanigans, therefore, contravenes this Court’s highest obligation.