1Ls v. God
73 U.Va 16 (2021)
Tonseth, P. delivered the opinion of the Court.
I.
Sunny skies, warm temperatures, and picnics on Copeley Field. Abundant wineries, the ability to manage a proper school/social balance, and a collegial atmosphere. What do all of these have in common, you ask? These were promises made to the current UVA Law 1L class at their admitted students weekend to lure them into paying for an overpriced Zoom School of Law Degree. While petitioners here have taken copious advantage of both the oversaturated wine market in Charlottesville and relied on their classmates in the truest sense of the Law School’s collegial atmosphere, their claim concerns the weather that has overtaken North Grounds, specifically the god-awful amount of snow recently. Never before has this esteemed Court had the privilege of deciding whether law students may enjoin God for preordained weather events, but no one is above the law, not even God himself. Although I relish the power I have bequeathed unto myself to rule against God if I really wanted to, I must rule against the 1Ls on both substantive grounds.[1]
II.
At the outset, God, through divine intervention, has requested this suit be dismissed for a lack of standing on the part of petitioners. God reasoned that 1Ls cannot possibly claim to be injured from the overbearingly cold, bleak, and grey weather lately. Nor have the large amounts of snow dampened their return to North Grounds. However, God forgot that “emotional distress is a harm within the risk of attending school.”[2] Therefore, I find an injury in fact to establish standing, even if that’s a mere prudential aspect of jurisdiction. Against the objection raised by God that standing is a requirement of Article III, I rely on the first Petty Rule of Civil Procedure: “We do what we want.”[3] Again, standing schmanding, I want the power to hear this case and rule against the Divine.
III.
Like Lazarus rising from the dead, God decided to save his best trick for last. Pointing to our ruling in 1Ls Gunners v. Everyone Else, “1Ls always lose,”[4] and thus must do so here. While my 1L colleagues may wish to override this rule as tyrannical, unfair, un-collegial, mean-spirited, and the works, it is a keystone of this Court’s jurisprudence. Further, in my reign of terror on this bench, this Court will not imply that rights exist for 1Ls through substantive due process.[5] 1L is supposed to be hard. 1Ls already got an easier journal tryout, the ability to attend class from the comfort of their bedrooms, and the opportunity to avoid all of the embarrassing stories that would result from one bad night at Bar Review. It is beyond any sense of reason to lay at their feet the ability to enjoin God for the snowy weather on North Grounds.
Lake, D. concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Introduction
We are ruling today on whether or not to issue default judgement against cold, absent Defendant (hereinafter “God”) and in favor of the well-prepared, delightful, good-looking Plaintiffs (hereinafter “1Ls”). This collective action has united a fractured class against one true adversary—God Themselves, and the unconscionable weather They have wrought.[6]
Facts
It has been a long, long winter. Plaintiffs have borne a series of increasingly egregious slights with grace: first the death and decay of Charlottesville’s lovely foliage, then 4 p.m. sunsets, then finals, then people saying “don’t you love having seasons,” and finally bitter cold and gray settling over town like a blanket made by someone who took up crochet to help with their anxiety and made themselves hate-finish it.
The record clearly shows Charlottesville is a Southern city, located in a Southern state, sold to prospective students as an idyllic mountain retreat. Google “UVA Law” and check through the images—how far do you have to scroll before you see snow?[7] Discovery has yielded testimony from at least one Floridian who was told “you can make it through the winters here with just a sweatshirt” and later had to chip actual ice off her windshield with an expired gift card on more than one occasion.[8]
Whose Injury Is It Anyway?
Me. It’s my injury. I have been injured by the snow, and so have the Plaintiffs. Justice Tonseth correctly concludes Plaintiffs have an actionable claim against God based on the extreme emotional toll the weather has inspired, but fails to mention the psychic turmoil 1Ls suffer as a direct result of the Law School’s deceptive advertising practices. Plaintiffs have cited expert witness testimony in support of their claim that this fraud was a matter of determinism, making God directly responsible. (See: Final Destination, 2000; David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, (1739)).
Conclusion
Plaintiffs have a right to seek damages against God for both injuries, and this court ought to allow their case to proceed. We cannot rely purely on sweeping precedent established three whole years ago. The Justices who wrote 1L Gunners are long out of touch with modern times, and could not have predicted a winter such as this. This Court must let the 1Ls go.
Kulkarni, S. concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Both of my esteemed colleagues appropriately recognize that 1Ls have standing to bring this case. God is all-powerful but justice ranks one step above. Justice Lake appropriately recognized the emotional and psychic damages that Plaintiffs have sustained as a result of the action at issue, relating, in part, to the false recruitment strategies employed in the past year. But even she fails to consider the emotional harm from losing the ability to see other 1Ls outside. The Law School recommends that interactions between students occur in a way that is compliant to health protocols. Chief among these protocols is a recommendation to meet outside, at a distance. God is working directly contrary to these goals with extensive snowstorms and extreme cold weather.
Beyond the level and scope of injury, the opinion of Justice Tonseth relies upon 1L Gunners, a case that continues to misdirect this court. In addition to pointing to this ridiculous precedent, Justice Tonseth claims that avoiding “all of the embarrassing stories that would result from one bad night at Bar Review” is a benefit that has accrued to 1Ls as a result of the tragedies of the past year. This one comment shows how far my esteemed colleague has strayed from the public with his devotion to one bad case; I am sure that Plaintiffs would appreciate the opportunity to enjoy an event such as Bar Review. Rights are not abrogated simply because of the class of people involved.
In two years, Justice Tonseth will no longer be opining on this court. In two years, I shall remain steadfast in my devotion to the idea that 1L Gunners sets bad precedent and all decisions made following it should be held void.
To conclude, Plaintiffs have an actionable claim and the Court should allow the case to proceed.
Schmid, J., concurring in the result.
I agree with Justice Tonseth that 1Ls cannot be granted the relief requested. I write separately to elaborate on two points. First, I am troubled by the attack upon our bedrock principle announced in 1L Gunners that “1Ls always lose.” As my time on this Court is nearing its end, I strive to ensure that stare decisis is respected and our precedents are not jettisoned willy-nilly by the younger members of this Court. The rule articulated in 1L Gunners has been a bedrock principle of this Court for as long as this justice can remember (read: since allll the way back to Fall 2018). This Court’s former Chief Justice Shmazzle[1] [9]proclaimed that the rule that 1Ls always lose is the “second-most important rule of this court” behind the principle that “we do what we want.” Such authoritative words should not be cast aside so hastily by the younger members of this court. Were we to overturn a “super-duper precedent”[10] such as 1L Gunners, I have concerns for this Court’s legitimacy. After all, the Court of Petty Appeals’ “power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception [that 1Ls always lose].”[11]
To actually give some semblance of legal analysis, I believe, in any event, that the Plaintiffs have sued the wrong party. The party who controls the weather in Charlottesville is actually the person who sends the weather-related emails to the Law School community: Dean Stephen T. Parr. As such, Plaintiffs should have sued Dean Parr for any perceived weather-related grievances. On either grounds, and consistent with this Court’s precedent, 1Ls lose.
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[1] This ruling may also be a duly-ordered penance for all of the shenanigans I engaged in at Bar Review.
[2] 1L Gunners v. Everyone Else, 324 U.Va. 22, 24 (2019).
[3] Law Weekly v. CoPA Copiers, 369 U.Va 96 (2019).
[4] 1L Gunners v. Everyone Else, 324 U.Va 22 (2019).
[5] NGSL v. UVA IM-Rec Sports, 73 U.Va 9 (2020).
[6] Diddy Morris has cooled it on the survey requests, and the camaraderie she inspired has quickly dissolved.
[7] Really, really far. Suspiciously far.
[8] This brave, anonymous student is filing a separate claim against the lying liars who lied to her.
[9] And Deposed Newspaper Tyrant.
[10] That’s the technical term, right?
[11] I don’t think Justice O’Connor would mind this paraphrase.