Virginia Law Review
v.
Virginia Journal of International Law
76 U.Va 3 (2023)
Allard, J. delivering the opinion of the court.
Background
This case is brought before us on appeal from the District Court of Petty Complaints. At issue is an age-old conflict between the Law School’s second and third most prestigious journals.[1] Defendant-appellant the Virginia Law Review (“VLR”) appeals the lower court’s denial of its motion to dismiss. In turn, plaintiff-appellee the Virginia Journal of International Law (“VJIL”) requests on cross-appeal that the Court review the denial of its motion for summary judgment.
In its complaint to the District Court of Petty Complaints, VJIL alleges that VLR has engaged in a pattern of discrimination and a host of dignitary violations against its members. These alleged violations include, most prominently, the labeling of a water fountain as “VLR Only” and a rule that members of VJIL enter the parties’ shared office space through “the scary door.” VJIL sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring VLR to refrain from excluding VJIL members from these amenities. Urging the court to enjoin this “invidious discrimination,” VJIL cites several persuasive authorities, including Brown v. Board of Education, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title III of the Civil Rights Act, and the dormant collegiality doctrine.
VLR filed a motion to dismiss based on several theories. They have appealed on two of those: that the District Court of Petty Complaints lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and, in the alternative, that VJIL’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. While we reject all of VLR’s arguments, we believe that the trial court should have granted its motion to dismiss. For the reasons explained below, we think that it would be funnier and more entertaining for everyone else at the Law School if both parties just duked it out.
I
VLR first contends that VJIL’s complaint falls outside of the jurisdiction of the District Court of Petty Complaints. VLR argues that the offenses alleged by VJIL are far from petty, and are, in fact, heinous offenses to the person, and thus outside of the court’s jurisdiction. At oral argument, VLR’s advocate, a reanimated Alexander Porter Morse, adeptly explained that VJIL’s complaint is better suited for an international human rights tribunal.
Secondly, VLR argues that even if the court has jurisdiction, VJIL has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While conceding that Brown and other binding legal authority forbid the blatant discrimination in which its members are engaged, VLR nonetheless asks the court to “[j]ust be cool and apply separate but equal—for old time’s sake.” VLR also contests VJIL’s reliance on the dormant collegiality doctrine, arguing that the only authority cited in support of that doctrine is dicta. See Hungry People v. Law School Student Orgs, 75 U.Va 12 (2022) (Pazhwak, J., concurring).
While we find VLR’s arguments to be legally sound, we reject them under the canon of uncomical avoidance. It is the well-established practice of this Court to avoid dispositions of a case that are based on legal reasoning rather than humor, and to give Justices wide latitude in pursuit of that goal. See Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake, 75 U.Va 16 (2023) (Lake, C.J., concurring) (“1Ls may have rights when it is funnier for them to win than it is for them to lose”).
Here, we can think of no outcome funnier than acknowledging VLR’s cruelty while refusing to grant VJIL relief. Indeed, willful blindness to cruelty finds support in the recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. See e.g., Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 492 (2023) (“[T]here is nothing fundamentally surprising about Congress declining to make [the imprisonment of legally innocent persons] remediable in a second or successive collateral attack.”) Furthermore, our decision today is supported by a legal fact which requires no elaboration: Nerd fights are funny. To allow VJIL to proceed with its case would likely foreclose the opportunity for a nerd fight of the highest caliber. In the interest of the Law School’s entertainment, VJIL’s complaint must be dismissed unless they can produce persuasive evidence that it would be funnier for their case to proceed.
II
Having decided that the lower court must reconsider VLR’s motion to dismiss, we decline to decide whether VJIL was entitled to summary judgment. However, for no other purpose than to add insult to injury, we note that we totally would have granted this motion had we reached the issue.
***
The case is thus remanded to the District Court of Petty Complaints with instructions to issue an order consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Morse, J., Concurring in part.
I write separately to note that while I agree with the majority’s application of the canon of uncomical avoidance, I believe that it fails to identify what would be both the funniest and pettiest outcome to this dispute. As anyone who has been into the new VJIL/VLR office knows, the crown jewel of this office—nay, of the Law School—is the pool table. It is a welcome respite from the cold calls, cite checks, and general hurly-burly of the Law School. The only thing that could improve it would be regular access to fine scotch and a selection of cigars which would make Churchill blush. Because it would be funnier[2] to turn the VJIL/VLR office into an upscale version of Miller’s, but I agree with the rule laid down in this case, I concur in part.
Sandu, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
The facts of this case have left me speechless, as has my (formerly) esteemed colleague’s lackadaisical approach to legal analysis. I write a separate opinion speaking for all VJIL members, nay, all law students, who have never been to their journal’s office.[3] Whether or not I knew about the layout of the VLR/VJIL office is irrelevant to my ability to express an opinion on the matter. It is not merely a matter of practicality—it is a matter of principle. And we are nothing if not a court of principles. Petty principles, but principles, nonetheless.
First, some may argue that Justices on this Court who are a member of the journals party to this litigation ought to recuse themselves. But this is not a consideration which our Court can entertain, else we would cease to function altogether. Many Justices on this Court belong to at least one of the two journals. Furthermore, this Court’s jurisdiction is over the conflicts and concerns of law students, and what are we if not law students? Must we recuse ourselves entirely from every dispute which reaches our bench? Must every judge in America recuse themselves from issues which impact the lives of Americans? This is clearly an untenable position.[4]
I must also express my concern for Justice Allard’s statement, “Nerd fights are funny,” becoming binding precedent upon this court. This Court’s jurisdiction is over what is funny, as Justice Allard’s opinion correctly identifies. However, it is a generally accepted truth that 1Ls are nerds. If nerd fights are funny, then 1Ls would be permitted to fight amongst themselves on both sides of litigation. In such a scenario, we would be forced to choose a 1L victor in violation of this Court’s most sacred provision: 1Ls always lose. While there is an addendum that they maywin if it is funnier, a “nerd fight” consisting solely of 1Ls will not allow the court the option to decide if finding in favor of a 1L is funnier, because a 1L will always have to win. This cannot happen. However, following the outcome of the present case, any case solely between 1Ls must necessarily be dismissed.
As to the case at hand, whether a student actually uses their journal’s office (or if their preclusion from the facilities is merely theoretical) is irrelevant when faced with VLR’s intentional infliction of emotional distress. Law students are inherently competitive beings with chronic imposter syndrome. Every day, VJIL members are forced to live with the guilt, agonizing over whether memorizing the Bluebook before orientation would have granted them access to that sweet, sweet VLR nectar. Denying VJIL relief now is akin to waiting until the middle of summer to let them know that they didn’t make it onto VLR. This is a cruel and unusual punishment which must not be inflicted.
While I concur with Justice Allard’s finding that VLR’s cruelty cannot be allowed to stand, I disagree with the outcome that VJIL cannot be granted relief. Not only is the behavior in which VLR is engaging plainly unconstitutional, it is also an affront to me personally during my birthday month.[5] For this reason alone, the Court ought to find in favor of VJIL.
Coleman, J., dissenting, joined by Allen, J.
It is a thin line upon which VLR treads. Its appeal simultaneously argues that its behavior with respect to VJIL was so heinous as to put the controversy outside our jurisdiction, and that it gave rise to no claim upon which relief could be granted. Because of their formidable intellects, I find their oxymoronic position consistent, and I disrespectfully dissent in full.
But the majority does not disagree with our brave Law Review students on the merits—as if such a thing were even possible. Instead, they rely on the novel theory of uncomical avoidance, best explained by Chief Justice, emerita, Lake, in Gay Section H, 75 U.Va at 5 (“There is nothing more vital to the exercise of justice than committing to the bit.”)
This doctrine is totally inapplicable beyond 1L disputes or the specific facts of that case. Chief Justice Lake was under duress when she wrote that opinion, having been berated by her staff for routinely confusing the two gay writers. The Law Weekly office was positively mutinous. So, in her darkest hour on this Court, she wrote an overly broad concurrence that is today being exploited by those same mutinous editors. I refuse to condone a shake down of this sort, and therefore refuse to apply the doctrine of uncomical avoidance beyond its original context. I would rule for VLR, as any sane Justice would.
---
tya2us@virginia.edu
[1] The Court will refrain from identifying which party is second and which is third, but we note the self-evident fact that the Law Weekly is first.
[2] And serve my own purposes.
[3] To be honest, I’m still not entirely sure where the office is, but I’m sure I’ll find it eventually.
[4] This Court also operates without law clerks, a fundamental deficiency in our current system.
[5] See https://www.horoscope.com/zodiac-signs/virgo (“Virgo is notorious for being type A but that's only because this sign knows that everything good can be made great, and that everything great can be perfect.”) Justice Allard is also a Virgo, so he should know better.