Law Students
v.
Miller Center
77 U.Va 6 (2024)
Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court, in which Jones, Demitry, & Coco, JJ., join.
Coleman, J., dissents.
Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court.
This suit comes before us on appeal from the District Court of Petty Claims. Petitioners, the collective UVA Law student body, sued the Miller Center for failing to advertise Justice Breyer’s talk scheduled for October 17. Relying on our precedent requiring events to remain open to law students, see e.g., Students for Attending Cool Events v. UVA Law Faculty, 76 U.Va 13 (2024) (enjoining the administration from excluding Law Students from events labeled as “open to faculty”), Petitioners argue that the Miller Center’s failure to adequately advertise the event to law students is a public nuisance.
After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court denied both motions, reasoning that a genuine issue of fact remained to be tried—whether any law students genuinely wanted to go in the first place. After a bench trial, the Court found that several law students were likely interested in attending the event and accordingly held the Miller Center liable for their failure to advertise the event. The Miller Center appealed, arguing that the court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous. We agree, and we accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I
As a threshold matter, we note that this Court has not previously held what standard of review applies to a lower court’s factual findings. Neither party, seemingly assuming that we follow federal practice (we do not), briefed the Court on this matter. Their oversight, while grossly incompetent, is of no import here. We believe that the District Court’s findings would not prevail even under a highly deferential standard of review. Accordingly, we will assume, without deciding, that the standard of review for the District Court’s factual findings is merely reasonableness.[1]
II
Justice Stephen Breyer’s speaking event at the Miller Center is scheduled for October 17. The event was first advertised to the student body in an email from Dean Kendrick, which was sent on September 24. A second university-wide Student Affairs email was sent on September 25. The event was discreetly listed in the middle of other talks at the bottom of the email. By the time the first email from Dean Kendrick was sent, in-person tickets to the event had already been sold out for almost a week. Only online tickets remained, presumably because seats had been meted out to older alumni and eager pre-law undergrads.
The Law Students took great offense to this perceived slight. Petitioners put forth testimony from law students, who generally described disappointment from being able to attend the event only virtually. Several students described feelings of exclusion and shock that law students were not prioritized for the event.
But the Law Students’ testimony did not go unrebutted. On cross-examination, none of Petitioners’ witnesses could recall a single Breyer opinion they had read. One witness even referred to him as “Stefen” Breyer.
The Miller Center also put forth evidence that a majority of law students would not even be in Charlottesville to attend the event. Respondent pointed out that the event is scheduled for the day after Fall Break, noting that the majority of law students take the whole week off instead of returning for Thursday classes. When asked about their travel itineraries for Fall Break, Petitioners’ witnesses claimed that they could not recall them or had not yet made plans.
Further, Respondent introduced evidence, scraped from students’ Instagram posts, that the only law students who had expressed interest in the event had planned to make a drinking game out of it. “Each time Justice Breyer talks about ‘liberty,’ drink. If he makes up a crazy hypothetical unprompted, finish your drink” read one post.
Despite Respondent’s complete takedown of the Law Students’ witnesses, the District Court concluded that it was “reasonably likely that some students would attend the event.” We believe this conclusion is unsupported by the evidence. We believe—and the evidence suggests—that roughly half of the student body will be out of town during Breyer’s visit. The student witnesses’ apparent unfamiliarity with Breyer’s jurisprudence further suggests that even those students who are in Charlottesville are unlikely to attend. And while the drinking game proponents’ mockery of the law is commendable, it contradicts their avowed interest in attending the event. We cannot uphold a decision that so blatantly ignores these facts.
III
While the District Court’s factual finding was patently wrong, we do not believe that is necessarily fatal to the students’ case. It remains to be decided whether the Miller Center has a duty to pander to law students, even if they are unlikely to attend the event. In Students for Attending Cool Events, we held that the Law School could not bar students from attending events that were advertised in The Docket because doing so would be a “bait and switch.” 76 U.Va 13. We believe it likely that the logic of S.A.C.E. applies here because the Breyer event was already sold out by the time it was advertised to law students. Similarly, Petitioners’ public nuisance claim may extend to the Miller Center’s decision to schedule the event for the day after Fall Break. Such inattentiveness to the needs of law students is perfect fodder for this Court.
Ordinarily, we would raise these arguments sua sponte and just rule in favor of the Petitioners. But there is a chance that by drawing out this litigation, the case will become mooted once the event takes place in the next few weeks. And, well, that would be pretty funny.
Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s holding and remand for further proceedings to determine whether law students need to show a likelihood of attending an event before they can establish standing to sue the event planner.
As an aside, the Law Weekly Editorial Board intervened in this suit, alleging unconstitutional interference with their reporting. They do not need to return to the District Court for reasons we decline to explain. We summarily grant their claims, with damages to be calculated based on the cost of a ticket to Miami during the week of Fall Break.
It is so ordered.
Coleman, J., dissents.
So much of the Chief’s opinion rings true, but he fails in his disposition of the case. The proper remedy is to enjoin the entire event. Upon arrival, Justice Emeritus Breyer should be diverted to the Law School. And the keycard access points should be programmed to shock trespassing undergrads.
The fact that the University would allow pre-law undergrads to attend this event at all is appalling. I hope that Admissions has to read dozens of cringe-inducing personal statements recounting the event. That is what happens when you let those animals loose on legal events.
But the Chief Justice is also wrong on his special ruling in favor of the Law Weekly. These editors lack standing because they can theoretically access all events with the office press pass. While it does bear the name Nikolai Morse ’24, we all remember him as a generic-looking white man and could all impersonate him with a simple vest.
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tya2us@virgina.edu
jxu6ad@virginia.edu
[1] As a general principle, we believe this Court has no obligation to defer to lesser courts.