In re the Ghastly Specter of Christopher Columbus
77 U.Va 8 (2024)
Allard, C.J., delivers the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court.
Background
This nuisance action was brought by a group of law students who allege that the ghost of Christopher Columbus haunts their fall breaks, preventing them from relaxing during the brief mid-semester[1] respite from classes, thus causing them significant physical, emotional, and psychological harm. Citing the ubiquitous annual think-pieces[2] on the historical relevance of Christopher Columbus and the gauche juxtaposition of “Columbus Day” and “Indigenous People’s Day” on calendars, students say they have had enough. They ask the court to enjoin the Ghastly Specter of Columbus from continuing to haunt these Grounds.
Because the Ghastly Specter of Columbus is a non-corporeal entity, Plaintiffs seek to hale him into court under our in rem jurisdiction. Appearing specially, the Specter of Columbus replied,The Court contacted several paranormal investigators to decipher the Specter’s speech, but no qualified candidate responded. Faced with this predicament, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to submit legal arguments on our ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Specter. Having read Plaintiffs’ brief, we now order the case continued for thirty days to give Plaintiffs the opportunity to identify a qualified interpreter. If no such interpreter is found, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Discussion
The Court of Petty Appeals exercises jurisdiction over “all petty disputes related to the Law School.” Students for Attending Cool Events v. UVA Law Faculty, 76 U.Va 13 (2024). Historically, we have broadly interpreted our jurisdiction, spanning from pandemic health protocols, 2L v. COVID Protocols, 74 U.Va 16 (2022), to fashion trends, In re Pleats, 303 U.Va 295 (2019), and even on several occasions to God, 1Ls v. God, 73 U.Va 16 (2021); Students of UVA Law v. God, 76 U.Va 9 (2023).
Any discernible limitation on this Court’s jurisdiction is surely defeated by the (in)famous first rule of petty procedure. See PRCP 1 (“We do what we want.”). So broad is this court’s jurisdiction, that a very wise justice once remarked that “jurisdictional argument serves only to assist this Court in reaching its word count requirements.” Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake, 75 U.Va 16 (2023). This is especially true in the instant case, which is entirely about jurisdiction, rather short, and published immediately after fall break.
Nevertheless, “[t]here is nothing more vital to the exercise of justice than committing to the bit.” Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff, 75 U.Va 16. Thus, we believe it proper in this case to write a rare and pointless opinion about personal jurisdiction, hopefully forcing our readers to suffer through memories of Pennoyer.
We most recently considered the reach of this court’s personal jurisdiction in Students for Early Spring v. Punxsutawney Phil, 75 U.Va 19 (2023). In Punxsutawney, we held that the Court could permissibly exercise personal jurisdiction over Punxsutawney Phil—who allegedly spoke only Groundhogese—provided that the court’s proceedings were “comprehensible” to him. Id. Further, in Law Weekly v. The Swarm of Murderous Bees, we effectively exercised personal jurisdiction over a swarm of bees only capable of communicating via buzzing noises. 77 U.Va 2 (2024). Plaintiffs rely on Punxsutawney and Swarm of Murderous Bees in arguing that the Defendant’s apparent inability to communicate with mortals should be no bar to our exercise of personal jurisdiction. We disagree.
In Swarm of Murderous Bees, the bees did not appear specially. Instead, they flew directly into Plaintiffs’ faces and their solo cups. There was nothing “special” about this. Accordingly, they had already waived objections to our exercise of personal jurisdiction. Further, the issue of personal jurisdiction was never raised by either party. Our failure to dismiss the case on personal jurisdiction grounds is thus non-precedential.
Further, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Punxsutawney ignores several key differences with the present case. First, unlike in this case, in Punxsutawney the court had access to a Groundhogese interpreter. Second, our decision to exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Phil in Punxsutawney was motivated by our skepticism that Mr. Phil truly could not understand English. Conflicting evidence in the record suggested that Mr. Phil’s alleged monolingualism was a convenient excuse for dismissing the case. Here, Plaintiffs have identified no comparable evidence of opportunism.
We believe that haling the Specter of Columbus into court without an interpreter to explain the proceedings to him would violate his due process rights. Plaintiffs object that requiring them to identify a paranormal expert able to converse with Fourteenth Century Genoan-Spanish spirits is unduly burdensome. We understand that identifying a qualified expert will be challenging and may perhaps prevent this litigation altogether. But the interests of justice demand that a defendant comprehend what they are accused of. The case is continued for thirty days, after which it shall be dismissed if no qualified interpreter is identified.
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