Students for Attending Cool Events (SACE)
v.
UVA Law Faculty, et al.
76 U.Va 13 (2024)
Allard, J., delivers the opinion of the court.
I. Background
Plaintiffs, Students for Attending Cool Events (SACE) brought this action for public nuisance against the UVA Law Faculty. During the week of January 28, the Docket, a daily email update sent to members of the Law School community, listed two events titled “Law & Technology Colloquium: Jeff Kosseff of the U.S. Naval Academy” and “Faculty Workshop: Cynthia Nicoletti.” Despite being in an email also sent to all law students, these events were labeled as only “[o]pen to faculty.” SACE alleges that, in a week where other events listed in The Docket included Unified Journal Tryout Information Sessions 1 & 2 and “Academic Success Session,” the faculty-only events were “the functional equivalent of the Met Gala.” The UVA Law Faculty, perhaps fearing the wrath of Professor Nicoletti, have not disputed this characterization.
SACE seeks injunctive relief against the Faculty for listing two faculty-only events in the daily Law School email. In Count 1 of their complaint, SACE argues that the closed events are an unreasonable interference with their enjoyment of the Law School’s public amenities. Count 2 argues that listing closed events in a school-wide email is also a public nuisance because it is a “bait and switch.” SACE asks the Court to enjoin the Faculty from including such events in the school-wide email.
The Faculty respond that students are not entitled to enjoy all Law School amenities and that their exclusion from certain faculty events is reasonable as a matter of law. The Faculty further argue that the nuisance alleged in Count 2 cannot constitute a “bait and switch” if, as they argue, the exclusion in Count 1 is reasonable. We agree that the exclusive events are reasonable and judgment is entered for the Faculty on Count 1. But we are persuaded by SACE’s “bait and switch” argument and order that closed events be listed in a separate email.
II. Discussion
This Court has jurisdiction over “all petty disputes related to the Law School.”[1] While an action for public nuisance has never been brought before the Court of Petty Appeals, it is undoubtedly among the pettiest actions known to the common law. And, in a case resembling a public nuisance action, this Court has previously granted injunctive relief against Law School-wide conduct in an action for nuisance.[2] We thus believe it appropriate to exercise our jurisdiction over this case.
Because the material facts are not in dispute, we need only determine whether the Faculty’s undisputed conduct constitutes a public nuisance. “A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”[3] Thus, we are presented with two principal questions: (A) Is attendance at all Law School events a “right common to the [Law School] public,” and; (B) Is it reasonable to exclude students from events listed in a school-wide email?
A. While law students are entitled to the enjoyment of most amenities, the Faculty may reasonably hold exclusive events.
An interference with public rights is likely unreasonable, and thus a public nuisance, if it “involves a significant interference with . . . the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience,” or if the conduct is “proscribed by . . . administrative regulation.”[4] This Court has generally favored students’ right to enjoy University amenities for which they have paid with their tuition.[5] Such cases have generally involved ensuring students’ physical access to spaces “held for the use and enjoyment of the public.”[6] But attendance at student organization events, and even consumption of food at such events, has been recognized as a public right enjoyed by all students.[7] Indeed, the Law School has recently emphasized the importance of the free exchange of ideas. Its speech policy forbids conduct that “interfere[s] with . . . a listener’s ability to see or hear . . . .”[8] The policy also notes that “some events at the Law School are open only to members of the Law School community.”[9]
We believe that the foregoing establishes a clear preference for openness in Law School events, but it does not forbid faculty exclusive events. While we have recognized students’ right to access amenities, we have generally done so in the context of public spaces and student-organized events. We are unpersuaded by SACE’s argument that the Law School speech policy only contemplates events that are restricted to “members of the Law School community.” Rather, we believe that the policy supports the administration’s authority to limit event attendance in accordance with the event’s purpose. We thus agree with the Faculty that faculty-only events are not a public nuisance.
B. While it is reasonable to hold faculty-only events, listing such events in emails to the student body is a public nuisance that must be abated.
Turning to the listing of such events in the Docket, we are persuaded that doing so is a noxious “bait and switch.” For the Faculty, the most crippling fact of this case is the misleading use of the descriptor “[o]pen to faculty.” SACE emphasizes in its complaint that the “[o]pen to faculty” descriptor appears “at the every end of the event listing.” The student reader’s attention is thus drawn to the event, only to finish in disappointment. The phrase’s word choice is equally misleading. “Open to faculty” is of course a euphemistic slight intended to mean “no students allowed.”
The Virginia Law Weekly filed an amicus brief in this case, emphasizing the public convenience harms of including these closed events in the Docket. The Law Weekly’s editors rely on the Docket to select events for reporting to the student body. The editors “frequently” propose to cover such events, only to realize that they are closed to them.
We are persuaded that the public convenience harms described by SACE and the Law Weekly are severe and that the inclusion of these events in the Docket is unreasonable. Students are henceforth entitled to attend any event listed in the Docket from which they are not explicitly excluded. Accordingly, SACE’s request for injunctive relief under Count 1 is denied, and their request for injunctive relief under Count 2 is granted.
Allen, J., concurring.
While I agree the Law School should be prevented from listing faculty workshops in the Docket, I arrive at this conclusion on the basis of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. While exclusion of students itself would not rise to such a level of infringement, the advertised exclusion clearly meets this threshold. It is cruel, insofar as students’ hopes are raised and then thoroughly dashed in seeing events listed and then realizing they cannot attend. The behavior is also unusual to the degree it is odd — seriously, why do they list these events that students aren’t allowed to attend? Thus, I would either enjoin the administration from excluding students from attending faculty workshops or, conversely, prevent the publication of such events in the Docket.
Coleman, J., dissenting.
As a public institution, the University of Virginia’s exclusionary policies are subject to review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[10] Since law students are not a protected class, we must employ rational basis review, meaning that the legislative means must be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”[11] Because excluding me from any event reeks of arbitrariness, I would hold that the “open to faculty” exclusion violates the Equal Protection Clause.
A “legitimate governmental purpose” exists in this case. The School wants to maintain order in their events, promote genuine scholarly discourse, and maintain an aura of exclusivity. These are all well and good.
But there is no rational relation between excluding law students like myself and achieving those goals. Students like me are wonderful, inquisitive, and respectful. Therefore, a blanket ban on all students is grossly overinclusive. Were the restriction limited to law students, then I would have no problem, since it is of course rational to exclude MBA students. In this case, if the means don’t fit, you must admit [law students].
I would hold that the Law School is forbidden from restricting any event to faculty only. Therefore, I disrespectfully dissent.
Sandu, J., concurring in the judgment.
While I agree with the Court’s final judgment, I would have not granted cert initially, as I believe plaintiffs lack standing. While I agree that such a case is undeniably petty, it appears that the overwhelming majority of students truly wishing to attend faculty-only events are 1Ls and/or Law Weekly editors who lack other ideas for articles.[12]
Among this Court’s foundational principles is the maxim that 1Ls always lose.[13] It therefore follows that this Court ought not go out of its way to confer a disproportionate benefit upon such 1Ls. As for the Law Weekly editors, this Court’s greatest commitment is to The Bit™, and I can find no outcome funnier than the Law Weekly being unable to meet its article quota because this very Court would not permit it.[14]
More fundamentally, however, plaintiffs lack any personal injury beyond the general harm suffered equally by all in the Law School community receiving emails with events they will never attend.[15] Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any imminent plans to attend such events and/or write articles about these events—a mere proposal to cover the event is like a nebulous plan to see elephants. And like those in Lujan whose passion for wildlife was insufficient to support their claim against the federal government, so too should these plaintiffs’ fleeting interest in attending faculty-only events be insufficient for this Court. ‘I don’t want to go, but I still want to be invited’ is simply not enough.
[1] Virginia v. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, 76 U.Va 6 (2023).
[2] See In re Pleats, 71 U.Va 21 (2019) (enjoining the “design, production, and marketing of pleated trousers” and ordering fashion designers to “burn any and all pleated pants in their possession”).
[3] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B.
[4] Id.
[5] See e.g., UVA Gym-Goers v. UVA, 74 U.Va 13 (2022) (“Access to the gym is necessary for students to make use of the memberships, memberships which they have paid for in the form of tuition.”).
[6] Id.
[7] See Hungry People v. Law School Student Orgs, 75 U.Va 12 (2022) (enjoining student organizations from “preventing food from being served the instant it is available” at events).
[8] UVA Law, Law School Speech Policy.
[9] Id. (emphasis added).
[10] See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
[11] Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981).
[12]Additionally, no evidence was submitted to the Court on whether Faculty themselves actually wish to attend the events at issue in this case.
[13] Unless it would be funnier for them to win.
[14] See Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake, 75 U.Va 16 (2023) (“There is nothing more vital to the exercise of justice than committing to the bit.”).
[15] Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).