Andrew Allard '25
v.
Editorial Board of the Virginia Law Weekly
76 U.Va 12 (2023)
Allard, J., delivers the opinion of the court.
Summary of Facts
Justice Garrett Coleman ’25 and Justice Andrew Allard ’25 are, ostensibly, writers for the Virginia Law Weekly. On January 15, 2024, the Student Bar Association sent out an email informing students that one Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. would be speaking at the Law School in the first week of the spring semester. Given Mr. Kennedy’s reputation as a wise and eloquent speaker, Coleman and Allard recognized the likelihood that the event would be a breaking story in the Law Weekly’s first issue of the semester. Both reporters submitted RSVPs to attend the event with the intent to cover it. The record does not reveal who submitted their RSVP first, but both parties have maintained that it was “totally me.”
Shortly before the first Law Weekly meeting of the semester, Coleman, in an act familiar to anyone with siblings, invoked dibs on the RFK story in a text message to the Law Weekly Editorial Board, noting that “The gods made this event for the Law Weekly.” “Dammit,” Allard replied. This action to quiet title followed.
I
A. The Court of Petty Appeals may properly exercise original jurisdiction in this case.
In addition to its well-recognized jurisdiction over all petty matters related to the Law School,[1] the Court of Petty Appeals also possesses and regularly exercises original jurisdiction over all petty disputes between editors of the Law Weekly and cases raising Law Weekly constitutional questions.[2] Because an editor of the Law Weekly has sued the Editorial Board, we are obliged to hear this case, however desperate and frivolous it may be.
B. The issue of ripeness is irrelevant to the present case and perhaps all cases in the Court of Petty Appeals.
Justice Sandu raises the possibility that this case should be dismissed on ripeness grounds because Coleman’s article has not yet been published. We will not address this argument because it is irrelevant. As has been REPEATEDLY PROVEN by SCIENCE, time is not real.[3] We are thus no less justified in intervening “now,” if there even is such a thing.
II
A. The Law Weekly Editorial Board must recognize an editor’s bona fide claim for dibs.
Allard seeks declaratory and injunctive relief nullifying Coleman’s dibs claim, declaring Allard’s superior title to the RFK event, and preventing Coleman from publishing his “really poorly written and frankly offensive” article about the same. Allard argues in his complaint that the Law Weekly Constitution contains no “dibs” clause, and thus no right to dibs can be claimed by editors or enforced by the Editorial Board. Coleman responds that the Law Weekly constitution protects an editor's right to call dibs on any story that may appear in a future issue. Coleman does not contest that dibs are absent from the text of the Law Weekly constitution but argues that substantive honor protects a right to dibs. We agree.
This Court has recognized that “[o]ur constitutional order was fundamentally changed when the Honor System was established in 1842.”[4] Somehow, this means that the Court can discover rights implied by historical vibes “as if they were explicitly granted rights.”[5] Under this predictable and principled formula, we find that the Law Weekly constitution protects dibs. Respect for the exclusive rights of dibors dates back to the late 17th century. By 1915, it had developed into a customary right in the United States.[6] It is today recognized by all civilized nations as essential to ordered liberty. To fail to recognize the rights of the dibor would plunge the Law Weekly into a Rousseauvian post-property dystopia. We decline to take that path.
B. An editor who calls dibs on a story may assert exclusive rights to the same if he gives reasonable notice of his claim.
Allard next argues that, even if the Law Weekly constitution recognizes a right to call dibs, dibs can only be called in-person during the Law Weekly’s meeting to assign articles. We find Allard’s arguments unavailing. Instead, we are persuaded by Coleman that dibs are effective upon a showing of reasonable notice.
Because the right to call dibs attaches to all abandoned and unclaimed property, a claim for dibs is analogous to ownership by first possession. This Court will uphold a dibs claim to the extent that other potentially interested parties had notice of the dibs. Here, it is undisputed that the dibor provided such notice. The Editorial Board, whose members are responsible for the assignment of articles, was notified of Coleman’s dibs claim to the story. That alone is sufficient.
C. Allard’s adverse possession claim to the RFK story is meritless, and it really suggests that he should retake Property.
Allard lastly argues that, even conceding that Coleman has some dibs right to the RFK story, Allard has superior title arising from his adverse possession of the story. Allard avers that he “camp[ed] outside of Caplin Auditorium for twenty-four hours in advance of the event” and argues that this was sufficient to extinguish Coleman’s rights as dibor.
We reject Allard’s argument because it makes zero sense. First of all, how do you adversely possess a story? There is no exclusive physical space that can be occupied to initiate a claim for adverse possession, save for the as yet nonexistent pages in which the article will eventually be published. Second, even if one could adversely possess a story, Allard has not identified a single case recognizing twenty-four hours as a period sufficient to claim adverse possession.[7]
While there may be circumstances in which a claim for dibs can be extinguished, for example due to the dibor’s failure to timely assert his rights, we decline to specify such circumstances here because the plaintiff has so utterly failed to make a case for doing so. Accordingly, defendant Coleman’s motion to dismiss is granted.
Coleman, J., concurring in the judgment.
As this Court is without a formal code of ethics, I of course rule in favor of myself. But Judge Allard, while noble in his commitment to neutrality, erred in reasoning against himself as a litigant. This case does not fall under my esteemed substantive honor analysis. Rather, the answer is found in ancient principles of property law, most notably the public trust doctrine.
It is well established that certain natural resources are owned by the sovereign “for the common use of all the people.” Matthews v. Bay Head Improv. Assoc., 95 N.J. 306, 316 (N.J. 1984). The same is true of news stories. Our sovereign, Chief Justice of this Court and Editor-in-Chief of our paper, lays original claim to all news, future and past. But he or she must preserve those stories for common and beneficial use by the writers of this paper.
In this case, RFK Jr. is “the air, running water, [and] sea.” Id. In his capacity as sovereign, Chief Justice Morse chose to respect my dibs over the story, as having a single author is necessary for its beneficial use. Equally within his sovereign capacity, Chief Justice Morse could have disregarded my claim as dibor. This “news-in-trust doctrine” should help to resolve future disputes because it holds that the Editor-in-Chief wields near total control over the disposition of news stories.
J. Sandu, dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment.
I write a separate opinion to address my view on the issues of ripeness and mootness, in light of the fact that we mere mortals are bound by the limitations of linear time, regardless of if, as my colleagues appear to hold, “time is not real.”
With regards to ripeness, at the time the purported “dibs” were called, the event in question, although scheduled, had not yet taken place. Nothing would have precluded both parties from attending the talk and both writing articles, after which there could be a fair comparison between the two pieces, with the Court ultimately deciding which one to print. At the time the dibs fight occurred, therefore, the issue was not yet ripe for adjudication, as it “rest[ed] upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”[8]
Furthermore, with regards to mootness, the case is no longer in controversy because we have already printed the article in question, only one page prior to the issuing of this opinion. No remedy funnier than this could possibly be granted by this Court.
[1] See Virginia v. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, 76 U.Va 6 (2023).
[2] See Gay Section H Law Weekly Staff v. Lake (Lake, C.J., concurring) (“There is certainly precedent for belligerent and underappreciated Justices suing the Chief Justice . . . .”).
[3] See generally the years 2020 through 2022.
[4] Students for Fair Socialization v. Student Bar Association, 76 U.Va 2 (2023).
[5] See id. (recognizing law students’ fundamental rights to inebriation and socialization).
[6] See Dibs, Online Etymology Dictionary (Aug. 15, 2018).
[7] Even Allard’s claim that he camped out of for even twenty-four hours is dubious, given testimony that he was seen being chased away from the auditorium by security early in the morning of the event.
[8] Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).