Aggrieved Students Seeking E-mail Solutions
v.
University of Virginia Information Technology Services
77 U.Va 3 (2024)
Allard, C.J., delivers the opinion of the court, in which Coco, Jones, & Demitry, JJ., join.
Coleman & Allen, JJ., dissent.
Allard, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.
Factual Background
UVA Information Technology Services (“ITS”) appealed a criminal conviction from the District Court of Petty Complaints for violation of the Comstock Act. ITS was convicted under charges brought by a private group of students, Aggrieved Students Seeking E-mail Solutions (“ASSES”). ASSES pressed charges against ITS under the theory that the “randomly-generated” usernames that ITS assigned them were obscene and that by sending students their IDs via email, ITS had violated the Comstock Act. This Court, having the utmost dignity, will not reprint the foul usernames at issue in the pages of its reports.[1]
The district court found ITS guilty on all counts, noting that ASSES’s first impressions in emails to professors and future employers were irreversibly tainted by ITS’s offense. ITS now appeals the lower court’s conviction on three grounds: that private prosecutions are unlawful and prejudicial; that the Comstock Act is void under the vagueness doctrine; and that the usernames are randomly-generated and not obscene.
I
We begin with the propriety of ASSES, a private party, initiating a criminal action. ITS objects that private prosecutions are unlawful, procedurally unfair, and prejudicial to the defendant. ITS filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges on these grounds in the lower court and appeals that motion now.
Firstly, ITS errs in bringing a procedural argument before this Court. As experienced petty practitioners know: “We do what we want.” PRCP 1. But, whatever, we’ll throw you a bone.
ITS correctly notes that private prosecutions have been barred by federal law for decades. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). But the Court of Petty Appeals is not bound by the holdings of lesser federal jurists. Moreover, Linda R.S. is inapplicable here. The Comstock Act at issue in this case is not a federal law; it is an identical law adopted by the Petty Congress.[2]
Accordingly, whether private individuals have standing to bring a criminal action is an issue of first impression for this Court. Though defendant ITS characterizes private prosecutions as procedurally unfair and prejudicial, several U.S. states still allow private citizens a limited right to initiate prosecutions. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 99 Idaho 511, 584 P.2d 1236 (1978). Though these states appear to be a minority, we believe their approach is consistent with this Court’s commitment to vindicating the public’s petty disputes. See PRCP 8 (“The more, the pettier.”). Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in denying ITS’s motion to dismiss.
II
We now turn to ITS’s challenge under the vagueness doctrine. The federal Comstock Act, upon which the petty Comstock Act is modeled, has repeatedly survived challenges on vagueness grounds. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 97 S. Ct. 1756, 52 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1977). The relevant language of the Comstock Act is as follows:
“Whoever . . . knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier . . . for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy . . . writing . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . . .”
In other words, don’t mail anything that a judge or jury might think is “obscene.” How much clearer could it be? Can’t you read?
III
Lastly, we turn to ITS’s argument that because the usernames are randomly-generated, ITS lacked the requisite “knowledge of the contents” of the obscene material. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 121. In the alternative, ITS argues that the usernames at issue are not obscene.
We find ITS’s arguments unavailing. Firstly, their claim that the usernames were merely random accidents is contradicted by an email exchange in which an ITS representative acknowledged to an aggrieved student: “Oh yeah, we noticed that and figured it’d be OK.” ITS cannot now claim it was unaware of the username’s character, even if it was randomly generated.
As to the issue of obscenity, we noted at the outset that the usernames at issue are too obscene to dirty the pages of this opinion. And we believe it uncontroversial that these profane usernames “lack[] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Accordingly, we decline to disturb the lower court’s application of the Miller test.
All of ITS’s arguments on appeal fail. We shall again note, as the trial court did, the severe pettiness of ITS’s offense. ASSES, without their consent, were assigned humiliating and demeaning usernames because of ITS’s policy. Such a petty injustice demands restitution, and this Court will grant it. The holding of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Coleman, J., dissenting.
My disagreement is categorical. Therefore, I dissent from each part of Chief Justice Allard’s opinion, and provide my takedowns in the same order. The Court today holds that 1Ls with humorous emails are entitled to justice, in plain contravention of bedrock precedent. See Law Weekly v. Swarm of Murderous Bees, 77 U.Va. 2 (2024) (noting “this Court’s repeated holding that 1Ls always lose”). It has contradicted Pet. R. Civ. P. 3 (“The funniest outcome must necessarily prevail.”). And it has revived obscenity law from an era in which Supreme Court justices would have to watch pornography together. See Katie Zezima, Why Ted Cruz Watched Pornography with Supreme Court Justices, Wash. Post, (June 29, 2015) (“Oh my.”). Living up to the name of this institution, the Chief Justice has fashioned himself a petty tyrant.
I
The Chief Justice begins his opinion with the notion that private citizens can bring criminal actions in this Court. Perhaps that could be true in the abstract, but petitioner has not come close to exhausting its remedies. Where was the suit asking for injunctive relief against the school officials? Where was the suit asking for monetary damages from the negative employer reactions? Because of this opinion, every new petty plaintiff will append criminal charges to their already-bloated complaints. And given that the Chief Justice and I already write half of this paper, we do not need more work.
II
Perhaps the most concerning element of Chief Justice Allard’s opinion is his reliance on the Comstock Act. In line with his ultra-conservative colleagues, the Chief Justice is trying to revive this dormant federal statute to limit access to medical abortion. See Emily Bazelon, How a 150-Year-Old Law Against Lewdness Became a Key to the Abortion Fight, N.Y. Times (May 16, 2023). He just wants to soft launch it on a case, like this one, that will have broad popular appeal.
The Comstock Act is plainly vague under current federal precedent. “It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits.” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (citations omitted). How is the ordinary person supposed to know what is considered “filthy” by Victorian standards when I am allowed to attend law school classes in birkenstocks?
Moreover, the Chief Justice fails in statutory interpretation. The law criminalizes the use of a common carrier to transport obscene materials. The 1828 online version of Webster’s dictionary defines “carriage” as: “the act of carrying, bearing, transporting, or conveying; as the carriage of sounds.” Noah Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828), https://webstersdictionary1828.com/. So, the law does not criminalize the mode of transportation. What would be criminal is if the emails were used to disseminate lewd content. But the fact that the emails are themselves lewd is no cause for criminal liability.
III
My correct statutory interpretation applies with equal force in this section. But there is the additional issue of the Chief Justice assigning knowledge to an entity based on the statements of a random employee. An analogous concept in securities law is corporate scienter. “Where a defendant is a corporation, this requires pleading facts that give rise to ‘a strong inference that someone whose intent could be imputed to the corporation acted with the requisite scienter.’” Jackson v. Abernathy, 960 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Some random employee does not provide the necessary “connective tissue” to infer that the entire ITS organization should be criminally liable. Id. at 99. Yet another reason why the Chief Justice was drunk when he wrote this opinion.
ITS, you have my sympathy. 1Ls should be forced to apply to jobs with obscene, randomly-generated emails. It is the UVA way.
Allen, J., dissenting
I write in dissent not out of callous disregard for the plight of those who come to this Court for recompense. Instead, the 1Ls in question lack standing because they have suffered no injury fairly traceable to ITS (which they have yet to learn about, in their defense). Rather, they have an alternative remedy readily available to avoid using their perverse emails—an email alias.[3] This allows anyone, not just these unfortunate souls, to create and use an alternative email address rather than that which is assigned to them by default.[4] As such, the continued use of the obscene email addresses is an injury which is purely self-inflicted.
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cmz4bx@virginia.edu
[1] Okay, maybe just a little. Among the filthy emails were bjs4me and fuc8kw.
[2] With identical case law interpreting it. Please just incorporate this into your belief system.
[3] See UVA Email Aliases, https://virginia.service-now.com/its?id=itsweb_kb_article&sys_id=acad334bdb3ac744f032f1f51d961941.
[4] At least, I think it does. I have vague recollections of looking at this as a 1L, a lifetime ago, and it still seems to exist. No reliance interest can be claimed if I am mistaken, as I have judicial immunity for my statements.